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Abstract 
Problem:  
There has been much talk over the past 50 years of the role of 
American labor in a changing American industrial market. As the world has 
become increasingly connected, American workers who tout high levels of 
labor rights, high wages, and safe working conditions have been hard pressed 
to compete with emerging economies that often share little of these same 
principles or legal decrees.   
The debate over American competitiveness in the world has been 
fought on the picket lines, on the streets, in back rooms and most importantly 
in the stolid, white, columned halls of Congress. While liberalized trade was 
supported in Congressional platforms in the post-war period, this stance has 
undergone a dramatic change toward protectionism.  With changing 
constituencies and increased globalization, the question remains as to what 
course on trade the American government will support, and in particular if the 
Democratic Party will continue down a path toward protectionism. 
 
Methodology: 
 This study is the culmination of more than a year of research which 
began during my internship with the American Enterprise Institute in 
Washington, DC. I have sought to use a wide variety of sources and types of 
media, ranging from websites and working papers to interviews and 
textbooks. My goal was to present an impartial presentation of the Democratic 
Party’s change in support on trade starting in the 1930s and progressing 
throughout the century. I separated the work into sections which isolate the 
most interesting and dynamic periods in international trade. 
 A large majority of the information which is presented in this paper is 
derived from I.M. Destler’s book, American Trade Politics, which is widely 
considered to be one of the most comprehensive and well-written books on the 
history of trade and trade policy.  
 
Argument: 
 My argument in this paper is that the Democratic Party has undergone 
a dramatic change on trade policy, from supporting a liberalized framework to 
being an incubator of protectionist sentiment, based on the influence of certain 
trade industries and, most importantly, labor unions.  
 
Conclusion: 
 The Democratic Party has been influenced by changing constituencies 
into supporting a more protectionist platform. While Democrats had a 
stronghold in the South, the movement of the party to the Northern states 
forced Democrats to support trade which protected American manufacturing. 
The effects of the 2006 and 2008 elections have built a Democratic platform 
that is increasingly protectionist and supportive of Fair Trade and labor rights. 
I have shown that this change is due to labor union pressure and the increasing 
vulnerability of American manufacturing.     
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Changing Constituencies and International Trade: The Role of 
Organized Labor on the Trade Platform of the Democratic Party 
 
By Chad Brooker 
I. Introduction 
There has been much talk over the past 50 years about the role of 
American labor in a changing American industrial market, specifically in 
trade competitiveness and increasing labor rights. As the world has become 
increasingly connected, American workers, who tout high levels of labor 
rights, high wages, and safer working conditions than the majority of workers 
in the world’s other countries, have been hard pressed to compete with 
emerging economies that often share little of these same principles or legal 
foundations of support. Workers rights have become an increasingly important 
topic for American labor since the birth of the movement in the early 1900s1.  
The debate over American competitiveness has been fought on the picket 
lines, on the streets, in backrooms and most importantly, in the stolid, white 
columned halls of Congress. Liberalized trade has always been a tough sell 
within Congress and the public, however, the prosperity and American 
Exceptionalism that it fostered for much of the 20th Century allowed it to be 
championed in Congressional platforms throughout and just prior to the post-
war period. However, this stance has suffered a slow degradation during the 
second half of the century as the once untouchable American manufacturing 
                                                 
1
 While the workers’ rights movement began far earlier and in some cases and in some 
industries reaches back to the 1600s and early 1700s, the real growth in reform and true 
amendments to the legal foundations of labor right did not fully develop until the late 1800s 
and early 1900s. This era is marked by literary works such as Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and 
other progressive pieces of literature which shed light on the poor, dangerous and unclean 
conditions in many of America’s factories. 
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began to face increasingly strong foreign competition—the pace of this rebirth 
of mainstream-supported protectionism rapidly quickened as the century came 
to a close.   
Since the late 1970s, labor unions have become increasingly vocal 
about the welfare of their members in relation to increasing global 
competition. While these unions represent a fraction of the workforce that 
they once did, they learned that with decreasing membership, they needed to 
speak louder to be heard. The percentage of the workforce that is under labor 
union representation has dropped to increasingly smaller levels. Between 1962 
and 2009, labor union representation fell from 35% of all full time employees 
in the United States to a staggeringly low of 15%; the rate falls to 13.6% when 
analyzing union membership.23 When the values for private sector employees 
versus public sector membership is included, it becomes clearer that while 
public sector union membership has slipped more slowly, private sector 
membership has plummeted. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
“Current Population Survey”, only 7.2% of private sector employees are 
members of unions, compared with 37.4% of public sector membership.4 
However, with the increasing trade, political and legal roles that labor 
unions play in the American system, the unions have successfully hidden their 
sliding number of members. Starting in the 1960s with skepticism about the 
effects of the Kennedy Round, labor unions laid their foundations of 
opposition to free trade and became proponents of “Fair Trade” legislation. 
                                                 
2
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010  
3
 Barenburg, 2009 
4
 Kleiner, 2001; BLS. 2010 
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This opposition led to the first wave of worker compensation benefits, known 
as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), ushering in a new wave of 
protectionist policies in select industries. The labor union battles quickened 
pace in the 1970s and 1980s as international competition began to truly 
threaten the livelihoods of millions of American manufacturers. With the birth 
of the 1990s, organized labor would be a formidable force in international 
trade legislation. By this time, unions were capable of not only influencing 
policy, but of controlling legislators and even constructing the means to 
heavily influence elections and the electoral platforms of primarily 
Democrats, but, as will be seen in the 2006 and 2008 electoral cycles, 
Republicans as well. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
debates in the early 90s, and increasingly over the course of this decade with 
the Bush FTAs, labor has turned up the bullhorn and the speed on the printing 
press as they churn out propaganda and campaign pressure on both 
incumbents and challengers. The pressure from labor unions and 
manufacturing state representatives has kept the “fair trade” vs. “free trade” 
debate at the forefront of every legislature. 
With the 2006 and 2008 elections, the slowing economy eventually 
leading to the great collapse starting in late 2007, and the rapidly declining 
employment in American manufacturing caused international trade and labor 
laws to become not just an important factor in the elections. In some races it 
was a central issue. International labor rights and organized labor in America 
have found central allies in legislators, particularly those from the Democratic 
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Party, building from the dissatisfaction in and around the NAFTA movement 
and continuing through the “dark years” of Republican governmental control. 
II. The Players: The Cases for Organized Labor and Free Traders 
Labor unions have long been vilified by business interests. 
Organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce and United Association 
of Manufacturers, and many other pro-business outfits across the country have 
claimed that organized labor is mucking up the works and is defending 
inefficient, non-competitive employment as a protectionist way to stop 
outsourcing and protect the American jobs which form their ranks. While 
speaking from a purely economic stance, this may have some merit in terms of 
being non-competitive in some industrial sectors, however much of their 
wishes to maintain competitiveness emerge from the true levels of efficiency 
and productivity. In order to understand labor’s argument and why business 
groups feel otherwise, it is important to look at each side and break down the 
complex economic and political connotations that are providing the 
foundation for this heated debate — a debate which is not uncommon across 
the highly developed world.  
A. The Case for Organized Labor 
American labor is well known for its quality, its efficiency, and its 
unparalleled productivity. However, as a group, it has been slipping in both 
power and size due to the emergence of an increasingly globalized world. It is 
difficult for American labor to be able to compete with what is often called a 
global “race to the bottom” where profit-seeking companies are willing to 
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move operations around the globe in an effort to minimize production costs 
and offer cheaper and cheaper goods to voracious world consumers. As will 
be seen when analyzing the Stolper-Samuelson model, the constantly 
increasing power of outsourcing, the vast growth in international trade, and 
the almost liquid international capital mobility5, is almost ubiquitously helping 
highly-educated, white-collar workers while eroding American 
manufacturing. Due to the unequal effects of trade, the complaints of 
American labor are justified.  
In order to analyze the case for labor, it is important to understand the 
major reasons why labor unions have been so adamant about their inclusion in 
all current and future trade agreements. The main reasons seem to be more 
than obvious, as the economic situation of the American blue-collar worker 
has slipped down an increasingly steep slope. However, there are many 
factors, some less connected to economics than others.  
Increased international trade has not only threatened American 
worker’s pockets, but has put them at a disadvantage in terms of crude 
manufacturing to much of the developing world. “U.S. exports to China in 
2001 supported 166,200 jobs, but U.S. imports displaced production that 
would have supported 1,188,200 jobs. Therefore, the $84 billion trade deficit 
in 2001 displaced 1,022,000 jobs in that year. Job displacement rose to 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted that there is strong if not almost total capital mobility in the current era 
under normal economic periods in a positive business cycles, when the world’s economies are 
experiencing strong positive growth, as was the case for the majority of the past decade, save 
the recession in 2001 and the global crisis to end the decade. The past three years since the 
official start of the global economic recession in late 2007 has shown global financial outfits 
that capital liquidity is not a guarantee in the modern world.   
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3,349,300 jobs in 2007 and 3,440,700 jobs in 2008.”6 Organized labor is quick 
to point out that more must be done to protect their place in the American 
labor market.  
Consumers in developed countries stand willing to pay a little more for 
their goods if there could be a guarantee that the goods were produced under 
fair labor conditions.  This is a beacon of hope for the unions who struggle to 
show the well lined pockets of Congress that labor rights are a popular idea. 
While politicians have consistently selected from American-made products 
such as hats, shirts and other campaign memorabilia, the mainstream 
consumer has long been assumed to only be interested in minimizing costs 
and care little about the processes and production but only about the price 
versus the quality perceived. Unions have long tried to show politicians that 
extending labor rights to trading partners is more than a wish to protect the 
American consumer but is in fact marketable, both on the product shelves and 
on the campaign trail.  
A number of surveys have been conducted that ask consumers if they 
were willing to pay more to guarantee safe working environments and fair 
labor standards for the workers who produced the good. Marymount 
University’s Center for Ethical Concerns, the University of Maryland, and the 
National Bureau of Economic Research produced three major surveys in 1999 
(Marymount conducted the same survey in 1995 and 1996 as well) looking 
into consumer opinions relating to purchasing ethically produced goods. In the 
Marymount survey, it asked “Would you avoid shopping at a retailer that sold 
                                                 
6
 “Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs”  Robert E. Scott.  March 23, 2010. EPI 
7 
 
  
garments made in a sweatshop?” to which, 78%, 79% and 75% of respondents 
answered in the affirmative  against the sweatshops  in 1995, 1996, and 1999 
respectively. In terms of compensation, 84%, 83% and 86% respectively were 
willing to, “pay $1 more for a $20 garment guaranteed made under good 
conditions.”7  
Respondents to the University of Maryland’s questions were even 
more generous, with 76% of respondents saying that they were “willing to pay 
$25 for a $20 garment that is certified to have not been made in a sweatshop.” 
Eighty-two percent in the same survey responded that they “Do not expect 
workers in foreign countries to make U.S. wages, but expect countries to 
permit wages to rise by allowing unions and/or stopping child labor.”8  
All of these responses were corroborated in the survey conducted by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research which asked fewer closed-ended 
questions. It found that consumers were willing to pay $2.80 on a $10 item 
and $15 on a $100 item if it was made under fair working conditions. In 
addition, it discovered that consumers would expect a decreased price if they 
were going to purchase a shirt made under poor conditions, demanding on 
average a $4.30 discount for the shirt.9 However, with all of these responses, it 
still remains easier to elicit positive ideas toward extending labor rights when 
referencing child labor than when speaking about union violence and 
blockades.  
                                                 
7
 Marymount University Center for  Ethical Concerns, 1999 
8
 University of Maryland, 2000; Elliot, 2003, p. 31 
9
 National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000; Eliot, 2003, p.31 
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While the vast majority of Americans benefit from trade, those who 
lose out are more often than not those can least afford to be effected, are the 
most disadvantaged, least educated, and often among the lower income 
brackets. The disproportionate effects have been catastrophic on equality and 
especially the already growing income gap. The income gap in the United 
States has grown exponentially over this century, the most prominent 
increases since the 1920s coming within the past 30 years.  
The issue has never been worse than today though. Currently, in the 
United States, the top 1% of Americans has an average income of $1.27 
million and represents 23% of the nation’s income. The top 10% makes up a 
monumental 49% of all national income.10 More worrisome is the effect on 
the lower classes over the past three decades. In the last 25 years, the income 
share of the bottom 80% of the population has been depressed by 7%, 
meaning that the income share of the poorest Americans — those most likely 
to be working in highly labor intensive industries like manufacturing and 
industrial — has dropped relative to the higher classes.11 Labor unions, 
activists, and “fair trade” legislators alike are thus supported in their disgust 
that in the most wealthy country in the world, 36.5 million people live in 
poverty and another 57 million have family incomes between $27,000 and 
$47,000, putting them in the “near poor” category.12  
This is occurring at the same time as workers bargaining power is 
being eroded though the reduction in union involvement. When compared to 
                                                 
10Bivens, 2007 
11Barenburg, 2009.  
12
 United States Census Bureau, 2010  
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national income, corporate profits reached a 56-year high and average wage 
has barely risen and income for a male worker in their 30s has dropped. The 
median hourly inflation adjusted wage rose very little — from $13.90 per hour 
in 1973 to $15.11 in 2007. At the same time, the average annual inflation 
adjusted income fell from $40,210 twenty-five years ago to $35,010 in 2009.13 
This means that Americans today, on average, feel poorer than they did over a 
quarter century ago due to this meager wage increase simultaneous to inflation 
being a constant factor. Using the inflation figures from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the average wage figures from above, it can be calculated 
that between 1975 and 2007 the average wage increased by $.05/hour per year 
at the same time as the positive inflation devalued this wage by an outstanding 
$.61/hour per year.14 This means that the forces of inflation pulling down on 
the value of the wages of the average American worker has been over twelve 
times as powerful as the forces, such as labor unions, that apply upward 
pressure on the wage. 
                                                 
13
 US Census Bureau, 2010; Bivens, 2007 
14
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010; Bivens, 2007 
10 
 
  
Organized labor is even more worried about the declining ratio 
between labor productivity and wages. The American worker has long been 
considered the most productive unit in the world, and even to this day, it is not 
uncommon to find statistics showing that American labor productivity 
supersedes all other countries. Shown below is the labor productivity in 2008 
among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and The World Bank.15 In 
economic terms, labor productivity is defined as a country’s GDP divided by 
the aggregate number of persons employed. With this in mind, it makes the 
fact that the United States is number two even more important since the 
United States boasts the third largest population in the world. According to the 
                                                 
15
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010b 
Gross Domestic Product Per Employed Person, 2008 
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U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of May 2010, there were 139.42 million 
Americans employed, representing 58.7% of the national population.16 
Americans have for much of the past century, particularly in the post 
Second World War period, enjoyed a level of compensation which not only 
kept pace with labor productivity, but in fact as can be seen in Figure 6.1, but 
outpaced labor productivity until the early 1990s. This change took place at a 
time when labor productivity was increasing at an unparalleled rate, nothing 
truly comparable in the past 60 years. The increase in labor productivity likely 
emerged from the increased use of technology in the workplace and the 
benefits that come with it. The use of technology has drastically reduced 
production times and increased output. Looking back at the equation for labor 
productivity, it is easy to see that a large increase in output and an increase in 
GDP, which is not met with an increase in income or other compensation 
variable, will serve to deplete the wage per output value. 
17
 
                                                 
16
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010c 
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Source: Economic Report of the President 2006,Table B-4918 
 
 It is natural then to question whether the emergence of increased 
international trade, globalization, and the stagnation in wages are related. In 
particular, unionists and manufacturing employees question whether 
globalization caused the stagnation in wages, and the backward slide in 
incomes of low-wage workers. Many observers answer in the affirmative – an 
answer that is full of implications for policy. Organized labor and other labor 
groups have been quick to point to this depletion in wage/output spreads and 
have blamed much of the decrease on the effects of international trade and the 
unequal labor conditions that exist in the major trading partners of the United 
States. Union leaders and critics are quick to call on the familiar cord of the 
“race to the bottom” as a way to not only cement the blame of the transition 
on the lack of a strong international labor body and ubiquitous international 
labor statutes which would allow the United States to more easily compete for 
international markets. The role of a labor union is to protect and increase the 
salaries of the workers which they represent. The declining salary share has 
eaten into this spread causing unions to become defensive as they are 
increasingly facing identity crises.19  
It is fair and entirely necessary to point out that labor unionization is 
most prevalent among low-skilled or skilled, but low-educated workers. 
Unionization is most common in the trade fields (mechanics, electricians, 
                                                                                                                               
17
 McLaren, 2011 
18
 Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007 
19
 McLaren, 2011 
13 
 
  
construction, and plumbing just to name a few) and among low-skilled 
workers in manufacturing and farming. There are exceptions to this rule of 
course as there are professional unions as well as many positions in public 
service that have union representation but are professional careers. However, 
these remain exceptions as the overarching rule remains true. Educational 
attainment is most often correlated with union representation; low-education, 
low- skilled workers tend to have a higher propensity for union membership.   
 The United States ranks highly among fellow industrialized countries 
in terms of educational attainment. Shown in the chart below is the 
educational attainment for the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries in 2007. Educational attainment is 
defined as the highest level of education completed by an individual and is an 
important indicator of the prevalence of skilled or unskilled labor available to 
the workforce in a specific country. As can be seen, the United States ranks 
third on this list with 40% of the adult population having earned a university 
degree and another 48% having completed a high school education. While 
only having a high school education is often considered to be representative of 
unskilled labor, in many nations that the United States trades with, (see 
Mexico, Portugal, Germany, Austria, and Italy who all have over that 75% of 
the adult population only having completed a high school education) the vast 
majority of the population does not have a university degree. Moving outside 
of the OECD reveals an even more stark reality, making the United States a 
skilled labor abundant country when compared to the vast majority of the 
14 
 
  
world, especially China. The skilled labor abundant status of the United States 
is important for wage and labor analysis, most easily shown in the use of the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade.    
15 
 
  
20
 
                                                 
20
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010b 
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The Stolper-Samuelson theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin model21 on 
which it depends are two of the most well-known theories in international 
trade and labor mobility. The Stolper-Samuelson theory has a profound effect 
on income distribution and world commodity and labor prices. The effect is 
often used to explain the profound losses that American unskilled labor22 has 
experienced in the last half decade, in both employment numbers and wages. 
Both models depend on the factor endowments that each country in the trade 
relationship processes, in this case the relative proportions of skilled and 
unskilled labor. It is important to note that in an age of increased globalization 
and labor mobility, the labor proportions (skilled vs. unskilled) are more likely 
to change due to legal and illegal immigration. However, both of these 
economic ideas depend on fixed-factor endowments that are mobile across 
domestic industries, yielding a set number of skilled and unskilled workers 
and a defined wage for each group in each economy. In a forthcoming book, 
John McLaren provides a comprehensive example of this effect using a 
hypothetical situation involving trade between China and the United States 
which uses accurate characteristics and fabricated numbers.   
While McLaren provides an in-depth setup for his explanation of the 
theorem, it can be simplified for the purposes of this research. He assumes 
                                                 
21
 Description of the Stoper-Samuelson and Hecksher Olin models derived from John 
Mclaren, forthcoming, 2011. For more on the model and its various empirical applications, 
see Feenstra, 2004, pp.4-29 and Chapters 2 and 3.  
22
 For the purposed of this discussion, “unskilled labor” will be defined as those having an 
educational attainment of a high school education or less. However, education is not the only 
way to attain skilled labor attributes so a more accurate term would be, as John McLaren 
suggests, “blue-collar” instead of unskilled and “white-collar” instead of skilled. 
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that there are two goods produced in the two countries - plastics and apparel - 
and that apparel is a unskilled labor intensive good, meaning it takes more 
units of unskilled labor to produce than skilled labor, and plastics is the 
opposite - a skilled labor intensive good. He also accurately assumes that 
China is an unskilled labor abundant country and that the United States is a 
skilled labor abundant country (see charts above for actual figures).  
23
 
Looking at the graph, we can analyze the factor endowments for the 
U.S. and China and the effect that this has on prices and output. A/P is defined 
as the relative output of apparel (quantity apparel/quantity plastics), and PA/Pp 
is the relative price of plastics (price apparel/price plastic). RSCH, RSUS, and 
RS W are the relative supplies in China, the United States and the world (with 
trade) respectively, and RD is the relative demand in the market for goods, 
                                                 
23
 McLaren, 2011 
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assumed to be a constant, negative linear equation. This graph shows that the 
RSUS is lower than both RSW and RSCH meaning that in the United States, 
there is a higher proportion of plastics produced when compared to the 
production of apparel and in China there is just the opposite — a higher 
proportion of apparel with respect to plastic production. These characteristics 
are due to the fact that there is more skilled labor in the United States; hence, 
workers specialize more heavily in plastic production than in China where 
there is an abundance of unskilled labor and therefore a higher apparel 
production.  Due to the greater production of plastics in the United States, the 
price of apparel relative to plastic is higher and the opposite is true in China 
where greater apparel production causes a lower relative price.  
When these two countries come together to trade with the world, 
relative supply lies closer to the production in China before trade due to 
China’s immense population. This means that the price of plastics in the 
United States will increase as the Chinese market is opened up to American 
export and the price of apparel in the United States will decrease due to the 
fact that the large apparel production in China will flood the U.S. markets 
with cheaper apparel. The opposite is true in China where the price of plastics 
will decrease and the price of apparel will increase. The effect alone, ceteris 
paribus, has a negative impact on the wages of labor intensive, low-education 
employment in the United States due to Chinese competition and has a 
positive income effect on highly-educated employment in the U.S. due to the 
opening of the Chinese market. The effect can best be described as assisting 
19 
 
  
the abundant labor resource in each country, meaning that the income gap in 
the United States will increase and the income gap in China will decrease.24 
This is seconded by Kim Elliot who writes, “It is also natural that increase 
trade with low-wage LDCs (low developed countries), and increased capital 
mobility, should concern workers and trade unions in advanced countries. 
Low-wage workers in advanced countries lose relative to high-wage workers 
and capital when trade and capital flows increase between their country and 
LDCs.”25  With this result, it is obvious why organized labor in developed 
countries like the United States, whose members are largely made up of 
“unskilled” or blue-collar workers, would oppose globalization without 
guarantees of protection and increased pressure to include labor laws and 
requirements in all liberalizing trading agreements.  
B. The Case for Globalization Enthusiasts 
It is undeniable that Americans as a group benefit greatly from free 
liberalized trade. Globalization enthusiasts are eager to point out that the 
increasingly pervasive forces of globalization stand ready to make America 
even more prosperous, allowing the United States to arguably remain the 
                                                 
24
 However it is important to point out that the theory of LDC-DC trade reducing inequality in 
developing countries is not without critics, like most economic theories. In an extensive study 
into the Stoper-Samuelson effect and post trade inequality in developing countries, Dollar and 
Kraay (2001)  have found that the results are inclusive to prove this reduction in inequality. In 
their report they found that while, on average, poor people did in fact gain proportionately 
from growth, that it did not always reduce inequality. In the 23 globalizing countries that they 
studied, inequality (measured by Gini coefficients) increase in 10 of the 23 countries, 
remained constant in 4 and did in fact fall in 9 of the 23 countries. Most notably they 
discovered that China and Chile, two of the better known and researched developing 
countries, actually had large increases in equality. However after carefully looking at their 
studies they did not accurately handle the rural China workers who have been largely left out 
of globalization. This stands to reason that the ballooning middle class and growing upper 
class in China will of course result in growing inequality with the rural poor who have been 
neglected and whose economic situation has largely have remained unchanged.  
25
 Elliot, 2003 
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global hegemon, only this time as the world’s consumption center – that is if 
they can hold at bay the protectionist forces of organized labor and the 
proponents of expanding international labor rights. Globalization enthusiasts 
are not just corporations and multinationals looking to expand their profits by 
taking advantage of third-world workers and weak foreign governments. 
These globalization enthusiasts are academics, politicians, businessmen, 
multinationals, and scientists to name a few. Globalization may be a scary 
thought - opening up to the rest of the world and allowing a freer flow of 
goods, ideas, and people - but if you are able to see past the work of 
globalization fear mongers like the late Samuel Huntington, it isn’t hard to 
realize the great economic advances that are capable from globalization, and 
that putting blocks, such as strong labor standards in the way of this growth, 
could be detrimental to the process. 
 However, it is entirely necessary to point out that unions and trade 
advocates are not two diametrically opposed sides in this argument. In fact, it 
should be pointed out that throughout the first half of the 20th century and 
until the 1960s, manufacturing and business was deeply rooted in the 
protectionist camp as they vigorously fought for trade restrictions in order to 
give themselves a comparative advantage.  I.M. Destler explains it best in his 
book American Trade Politics when he writes, “Through much of U.S. 
history, it was manufacturers who led the charge for high tariffs. In the 
decades following 1934, it was protection-seeking firms and sectors whose 
efforts needed to be resisted or deflected in order for trade liberalization to 
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proceed. By the dawn of the 21st century business was clearly identified with 
trade expansion, by critics and advocates alike.”26 While the position of 
American industrialists and corporations has undergone an almost complete 
180 degree change one would be hard to find a globalization enthusiast who 
supports child labor and is more than okay with compulsory labor. “Labor and 
other human rights are fine, in their view, but should not get in the way of 
promoting growth through free trade and markets.”27In fact most enthusiasts 
agree with organized labor in support of a majority of the “core” labor 
standards, they are more afraid of the efforts that are in place to instill “cash 
standards” which will negatively affect the comparative advantage of 
developing countries, cheap labor.  
Before moving on it is important to distinguish cash standards and 
core standards from each other. Cash standards represent increases to labor 
standards which involve the compensation of the worker or the time period 
over which an employee is allowed to work. These standards include 
minimum wage, benefits (such as retirement, health care, worker’s 
compensation, and any other cash-based employer provided benefits), number 
of hours per day and per week regulations, safety regulations and codes, and a 
number of other regulations. While some activists and many organized labor 
organizations often include one or more of these standards in their ideas of 
core standards (often a minimum wage, hours allowed and workplace safety 
concerns), the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines core labor 
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standards more specifically. They have four core standards which include: 1) 
freedom from forced labor; 2) nondiscrimination in the workplace; 3) 
effective abolition of child labor; and 4) freedom of association and the right 
to organize and bargain collectively.28  
While the current debate in the global stage is over primarily these 
core labor standards, organized labor consistently pushes the adoption [or at 
least a commitment to forward, of at least some of the cash standards]. 
Globalists and businesses alike point out the fact that it is these cash standards 
that would be detrimental to growth and commerce. These cash standards also 
represent a dangerous intervention of one government into the business and 
social laws of another developing-nation - a main reason why Republican 
lawmakers have, over the past 40 years, made a transition toward siding with 
business again the idea of instituting labor regulations into present and future 
trading agreements and international organizational codes. 
It seems hard to imagine that the labor side of the debate would be able 
to effect policy in the ways and to the extent that they do, seemingly pitted 
against a well-funded and well-connected behemoth that is reminiscent of a 
David and Goliath reference.  But who are these Goliaths and what do they 
really stand for. As Kim Elliot puts it, “The policymakers that promote 
globalization, by contrast, have government, international, and corporate 
resources behind them. They have the authority to develop trade policies and 
to administer the structural adjustment and financial stabilization programs 
that they view as in the world’s interest. They are powerful figures in the 
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global economy, with billions of dollars to leverage their policy 
prescriptions.”29  
As we look into the globalist’s stance on labor rights, it is important to 
focus on the reasons why they have presented an obstacle to international 
labor standards. The first of such concerns is the effects that these standards 
will have on the growth potential of international business and most 
importantly of developing countries. The second concern is that organized 
labor is putting too much emphasis on the loss of American manufacturing 
jobs while the U.S. remains the top global manufacturer - American 
manufacturing represents far less of a fraction of national GDP as it once did 
and manufacturing employment is tied to technological substitution. The third 
and most important reason behind blocking expansive international labor 
standards lies with the foreign workers who could be hurt by expanding 
standards; while the individual workers may benefit, in the long run, the 
workers lose out to potential opportunities as well as freedom to institute their 
rights as they see fit. 
 Do strong labor standards spell a drastic recall to international growth, 
specifically in the Asian nations which have posted unthinkable growth based 
on their cheap labor and production capabilities? Asian countries are the only 
examples of successful development since World War II. Countries such as 
South Korea have gone from utter destruction and decimation to having the 
15th largest GDP in the world at almost $1 trillion.30 East Asia’s development 
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has been widely called the “Asian miracle” and billions of the world’s people 
are being lifted out of poverty as countries like China have expanded. 
However, increasing labor standards may bring this drastic growth under 
arrest and globalists are crying foul that it is the intention of organized labor to 
reel in this growth and create a more equal playing field for American 
workers. In 1994, Mahathir bin Mohammad accused developed countries’ 
governments of trying to use standards as a weapon against developing-
country growth, writing that “Western governments openly propose to 
eliminate the competitive edge of East Asia…. The professed concern about 
workers welfare is motivated by selfish interest… to put as many obstacles as 
possible in the way of anyone attempting to catch up and compete in the 
West.”31 It is this growth which may eventually lead to the domestic 
imposition of labor standards in many of these developing countries, allowing 
the people to have a say in which standards, if any at all, that they see as 
necessary. The fight for labor rights in each individual developing market will 
be a more stable and efficient process given the fact that not all markets will 
require the same rights. This will allow the governments to focus on the rights 
which are necessary, expediting the process and avoiding unneeded rights 
which can be burdensome to business and restricting on GDP growth. 
The truth is that the imposition of labor rights, and the work of labor 
unions, does have a negative impact on the GDP of countries, especially in the 
developed world where unions are both powerful and have been able to instill 
numerous standards. As can be witnessed in the below graph, the United 
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States does not depend as much on trade as a component of its GDP. Among 
the countries presented, the United States ranks last in dependence and 
prevalence of trade in GDP. This is not to say that the United States is not a 
heavy trading partner. In fact it has the largest aggregate value of imports and 
exports in the world, but due to the fact that the United States has a GDP of 
$14.26 trillion, according to the 2009 CIA estimate, the total value of trade 
cannot compare to this economic power. 
 This GDP could be even higher in the absence of strict rules imposed 
on companies through the actions of Western governments and organized 
labor.  According 
to a major study 
done by Richard 
Vedder and 
Lowell Gallaway 
in 2005, they 
found that over the 
54-year period 
they studied  
(1947-2000) the 
total aggregate negative effect of unionization in America by 1992 - in terms 
of lost income and competition based wage differentials - exceeded $50 
trillion. This is a staggering amount seeing that current economic estimates of 
the total cost of the projected deficit in Medicaid amounts to approximately 
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the same figure, meaning that if we were able to recover  the losses due to 
unionization, we could theoretically use that amount to completely fix one of 
this nation’s greatest looming problems, deficits in the Medicaid program. The 
effects on developing countries would be much more drastic. The future 
prosperity and industrialization of these countries depends on the success of 
this period of economic expansion; anything that may affect this delicate 
scenario could permanently rob the country of both potential growth and 
trillions of dollars in future GDP.32 
33
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Even though employment in the manufacturing sector in the United 
States has declined over the past half century, America remains the world’s 
largest producer of manufactured goods. It is fair to point out that many more 
jobs have been lost due to technological substitution as they have been due to 
low-cost foreign competition. As can be seen in the pie chart below, the 
United States produces 18% of the total global manufacturing output, leading 
all of the world’s countries and only being eclipsed by the combined output of 
the European Union which sits at 24.5%.34 This should be taken as evidence 
of the fact that although the United States has witnessed huge losses in 
manufacturing employment the United States has not given up its long held 
role of being both the leading producer and the consumer of the world’s 
manufactured goods.  
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An important concept surrounding the loses in manufactuirng 
employment that combats the organized labor argument that free trade has 
caused the downsizing is technological substitution.  Globalization supporters 
are quick to point out that technological substitution has played a pivotal role 
in the advancement and expansion of American manufacturing into the 21st 
century, allowing the U.S. to stay competitive even when it was losing its 
manufacturing edge in some industries. It is important to note that while 
organized labor points to the jobs which have been lost as detrimental to our 
society, globalizers believe that this downsizing has been met with an 
expansion  to labor productivity and capital investment, allowing the United 
States to remain at the top of global manufacutirng and break into the high-
tech fields of the future. This technological innovation and substitution does 
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come at a cost to the workers who used to be employed in these industries. 
But, organized labor must look at the issue intellectually and objectively and 
racknowledge that many of the jobs that have been lost are in industries that 
are no longer competitive in the United States. Supporting noncompetitive 
industries such as American low-skilled manufacturing (textiles and shoes) is 
not only holding back American workers from potentially more lucrative and 
more advanced careers, but as shown before, presents an enormous drain on 
resources which could be better allocated and pulls down GDP due to dead-
weight loss. 
Strong labor standards in international trade that are meant to level the 
playing field between American manufacturing workers and developing world 
employment have the most drastic effects on the workers themselves, and 
most directly, on international workers. Organized labor admittedly does in 
fact protect American workers and goes a long way to increase wages and 
defend the vital standards that keep American workers safe in their 
workplaces. However, this was not always the case and the current standards 
situation is the product of over 100 years of back and forth arguments to reach 
an agreement over standards. However, organized labor and standards 
advocates now seek to force the more than a century of trial and error in labor 
regulations that developed countries have undergone on our trading partners, 
regardless of whether it truly is helpful to them and appreciated by them. 
Increasing standards has and will continue to have the most direct effect on 
the workers themselves, reducing potential employment in all union-protected 
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sectors and taking away from developing-country workers the chance to work 
toward the American dream, which is enjoyed by so many Americans today. 
Strong, pervasive labor standards have made America’s workers safer 
but they also 
negatively affect 
workers. Pushing 
these standards on 
our trading partners 
will hurt American 
workers and foreign 
workers. The 
expansion of global 
labor rights won’t 
have such a direct 
and drastic effect on 
American workers, 
but they will 
assuredly be 
affected. Labor unions were shown to have a negative effect on U.S. GDP and 
this reduction serves to reduce the earnings potential of workers as well. In the 
same study by Vedder and Gallaway, they used quantitative analysis to show 
that strong organized labor has led to the overall decrease in the wages that 
could have been earned on a state average per capita basis. This is likely due 
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to the fact that as organized labor forces wages rise, the wages of those people 
who are unprotected remain constant, or in other words, fall relative to union 
employment.  
It is also a well know concept that unionization has and will continue 
to cause a decrease in employment. “Presumably, the union presence in (a) 
sector will lead to wages among union members rising above the competitive 
standard. This will reduce employment in the union sector….”36As the 
incomes that companies must pay rise, there is less money to spend on the 
hiring of new employees. In some cases, in the wake of the increase there is 
not enough money to maintain current workforce numbers absent an increase 
in corporate profits. Therefore, while the purpose of unions is to increase 
wages and attempt to guarantee safer and more secure employment for the 
workers they represent, unions, by their nature and role alone, have the 
capacity and have in actuality, cost the jobs of a number of Americans in an 
attempt to secure others.  This represents a troubling situation for developing 
countries that are finally attaining employment growth and can see prosperity 
on the horizon. 
The American worker is assisted beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
international expansion of labor rights as it allows them to gain some of the 
low-skill manufacturing competitive edge that has shifted to low-wage 
developing-nations, allowing for the market to support some jobs in the 
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United States which would have been outsourced ceteris paribus.37 However, 
this is not to say that these same workers in the United States who are 
benefitting are not also being hurt by the extension of these rights. These 
workers are not likely to see their incomes rise after standards expansion 
despite the fact that the goods they purchase are guaranteed to rise. The 
American consumer, and global consumers in general, have claimed a 
preference for large quantities of cheaper goods and based on the success of 
brands such as Wal-Mart and Target, there is clearly a market for cheap goods 
contrary to the survey results presented in Kimberly Eliot’s work. It is 
primarily the low-skilled, low-wage workers who are most likely to take 
advantage of low-cost big box stores in order to save money and provide for 
themselves and their families. A rise in global standards will mean that 
developing-world workers will have be to paid more or will at the very least 
require more money to maintain production under the new guidelines. This 
means increased export good prices and low-wage consumers in developed 
nations will suffer a relative decrease in purchasing power. In addition, the 
companies who hire them might also have operations in these developing 
countries. Once their bottom lines are raised by international standards, profits 
will suffer and so will employment, and the least cost-effective workers will 
be let go, leading to American layoffs. 
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Developing-nation workers who maintain their jobs stand to gain the 
most from expanding international labor standards. However in the aggregate, 
it is these workers who will suffer the most detrimental side effects. Globalists 
and corporations alike have been quick to point out the fact that expanding 
these rights too quickly will lead to a negative impact on the very people that 
these standards are allegedly designed to protect. The most detrimental aspect 
will assuredly be a drop in developing-country employment. Shown in the 
charts below are the GDP and GDP per capita for the South East Asian 
nations for 2008. It should be noted that the South East Asian nations have 
undergone tremendous growth over the past two decades. The growth is most 
easily represented in the meteoric rise of China and most drastically since 
1995 when China entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Adopting strong labor standards would place this growth at risk when the 
peoples of these countries are just beginning to rise out of abject poverty and 
become real players in the global economy. The second graph clearly shows 
this rise on a per capita basis - the nearly vertical line after the late 1990s and 
throughout the 2000s. Globalists know that accepting these standards will put 
a halt on the rise of the developing middle class. 
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Labor standards have a negative impact on aggregate employment. 
The developing-nations of Asia, in particular, have notoriously had issues 
with employing their often ballooning populations and increasing the cost that 
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firms will face entering into a more strict market. This will only lead to these 
same companies adding fewer jobs or downsizing the current number of 
positions in order save money amid the increased costs. While the jobs that 
they may be working may not be on par with the quality and standards in the 
developed world, the positions that these globalizing corporations offer are 
often unfathomably better than the ones that were available prior to the 
economic growth – documentaries often show workers in these developing-
nations picking through garbage to find scrap metal or doing similarly unsafe 
and poor quality jobs. Globalization supporters claim that organized labor has 
failed to provide options for the third-world workers who are displaced by 
increasing standards. In the large urban cities of the developing world where 
many of these jobs are located, there are often no alternative jobs for these 
workers to fall back on, especially in China where many workers have come 
into these urban centers from the rural farming areas. It would be a shame to 
rob them of the economic growth potential that lies within globalization and 
the opening of free markets.  
As a secondary detriment to the people in the developing world, 
forcing labor standards on foreign governments and workers does not allow 
them to have the rights to control their own security and safety. In a country 
so in tune with its own limitations under the Federalist system, globalists cry 
foul that the United States is attempting to impose labor standards on 
developing-nations. It should be noted that the United States did not begin to 
institute labor rights until the turn of the 20th century and only after both 
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significant legal efforts and after the United States had industrialized to the 
point where the labor rights were in strong demand. There is strong evidence 
to prove that with the growing middle class in China and other developing-
world countries citizens too will begin to demand increased labor rights. As 
long as a forum to discuss and fight for these rights is present or at least 
feasible in these countries, it is fair to assume that workers in the developing 
world will too begin to demand labor standards, regardless of developed-
nation pressures. 
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III. Changing Constituencies and Changing votes: A recent history 
of American Trade policy  
 
There has been a drastic change within the Democratic Party over the 
past century in dealing with free trade. Since 1962 the Democratic Party has 
been marching in lockstep down a path toward decidedly more rigorous and 
specific regulations being attached to Free (or Regional) Trading Agreements 
(FTAs). In the 2006 and 2008 elections, more than ever before in the past 50 
years, issues of free trade took hold over the election and became a central 
piece of not only voting patterns, but campaign attention and advertisements. 
Millions of dollars were spent and many of the most hotly contested battles in 
Ohio, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and in many other old 
manufacturing-based states in the Northeast and Midwest were built upon 
opposition to the recent free trade agreements negotiated under President Bush 
and to NAFTA passed by President Clinton. 
 With the economy in the grips of the worst recession since the Great 
Depression, rising unemployment in the United States, especially within 
manufacturing, protecting the interests of American workers is even more 
important. Protecting these interests by curbing the “freeness” of FTAs has 
become a winning formula for the Democratic Party which had operated 
under the idea that Free Trade Agreements would always benefit the 
American worker and allow Americans to prosper amid increasing 
globalization. The Democratic Party no longer prescribes in large numbers to 
this logic as the world has advanced beyond a point where the power of 
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emerging economies to change the fabric of international commerce can be 
ignored. 
 The Democrats in Congress won big in 2006 and 2008 by promoting 
the ideas that protectionism is a good thing for the United States and in their 
individual states and districts. Protectionism safeguards the manufacturing 
jobs in the U.S. that have been hit hardest over the last 20 years. However, the 
question lies as to whether the protectionist case of instituting worker rights 
provisions in any and all future trade agreements does in fact help American 
workers or hurt them. Democrats and their growing base of people who have 
been adversely affected by trading agreements and globalization are 
promoting the idea that agreements on labor rights and laws should have and 
must have a place in trading agreements negotiations. The idea of factor 
mobility explains the basis of why the Democrats have made this switch 
toward protectionist policies, and why they will continue to champion the 
cause of labor rights as having a critical place in protecting the future 
wellbeing of not only hard-working blue-collar Americans, but for the future 
of American businesses and competiveness in the face of growing world 
powers like China, who have a seemingly unlimited supply of workers willing 
to work in poorer conditions for very little wages.  
However, the issue of competing with developing world powers, like 
China, goes deeper than the surface problems which touch the lives of 
Americans in the manufacturing industry and takes precedent in the American 
political arena. Enacting labor rights and requirements statues in trade 
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agreements could have lasting and potentially damaging consequences for the 
world economy and the standard of living for billions of the world’s people if 
not handled properly. The American trade policy being championed by advent 
fair traders in Congress, a collation whose ranks ballooned in 2006 and 2008, 
will lead to an overall decrease in the standard of living for the world’s 
poorest nations – contrasting the claims of labor rights advocates. If their 
views are not diluted and lessened by more moderate voices in the Democratic 
Party and in government as a whole, too powerful labor regulations could 
stifle the growth that many developing countries have been enjoying for the 
last decade.  
Whichever side of the labor argument, free trade or fair trade, is 
declared the winner in a game that could not possibly be “won” for all 
intensive purposes, there are favorable wind filling the sails of the fair traders 
and those who study trade and international commerce should realize that 
there will be labor stipulations built into future US RTAs and FTAs; the 
question will be how strong the provisions are and whether the world’s 
developed and developing countries will agree to change their ways in order 
to covet the growth potential inherent in relations with the United States, the 
economic engine of the world. 
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IV. The Beginnings of the American Divide on Trade: A 
Democratic  Turnaround. 
 
I. Democrats in Congress: A Territorial Shift, and Platform Change 
 
A. Democratic  Trade Platform during the Great Depression and 
Post-War Boom 
 
For much of the 20th century, trade has been characterized by a general 
movement toward freer, liberalized trade practices. While there have been 
some heinous examples of protectionism and movement to retract, both 
parties, until the last half of the century, moved toward liberalized trade. As 
can be seen in the chart below, Democrats and Republicans had staked out 
their own opposing viewpoints on international trade throughout the 19th and 
early 20th century.  
The Democrats, holding the majority of their seats in the rural and 
agricultural South, supported free trade practices as it opened up the markets 
to which American produce, cotton, and other raw materials could be shipped. 
In the North, made up of primarily Republican districts (the political layout of 
the country would not fully change to its current or more recognizable layout 
until the 1960s), the heavy influence of manufacturing and factory labor made 
the balance more difficult.  Republicans thusly, protecting their constituency 
and attempting to make a protective nest for the growing but still infant U.S. 
manufacturing sector, tended to vote more heavily in favor of restrictions to 
liberal international trade, at least until World War II.  
 
 
41 
 
  
Figure I-1 
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In the 1930s and the early Roosevelt administration, the majority of 
Democrats were supporting the reciprocal trade platform, and almost all 
Republicans had opposed it.40 It was very difficult for the Republican, and 
then the Democrats, to support a platform on trade which disproportionately 
negatively affected their constituency, regardless of whether it was good for 
the nation as the whole. In his landmark book, Destler points out this delicate 
balance. He claims that in most circumstances open trade, by maximizing 
economic efficiency, enhances the welfare and the standard of living in the 
U.S. and in the wider world.  
However, due to the fact that the costs of international trade are 
concentrated, they bear particularly on those firms and workers whose home 
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market will be diminished by foreign competition. In this case, American 
manufacturing, which has faced increasingly tougher foreign competition 
since World War II, stands to lose to the greater low value added (LVA) 
manufacturing (textiles, shoes, simple manufactured products) 
competitiveness in the developing-world. He says that trade policy must 
respond to the concerns of those inversely affected, and that some form of 
action constraining some imports will typically be part of this response.41  
In the 1930s, renowned political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued 
that the wide discrepancy in Senate voting patterns and movement on the trade 
issue was very heavily influenced by an imbalance on trade. Since the Great 
Depression destroyed the demand that fed Northern U.S. manufacturing, 
Republicans began a decade-long slide on trade that saw few, if any, 
Republicans supporting trade liberalization. Labor unions in the North, 
feeding off of the difficult economic period, pressed their representatives hard 
for protectionist measures. Their goal was to isolate themselves from the 
global depression that saw foreign trade drop by over 50%, in part due to 
falling incomes and a wave of trade barriers which protected national 
manufacturing interests at the cost of world trade. However, it should be noted 
that the power of labor unions in really influencing trade agreements, other 
than industry specific protections, would not truly develop until the latter part 
of the century.  
With the Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress and the 
presidency, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff represented the power of organized 
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labor that would revive later in the century during another tough economic 
period. The tariff was passed with strong Republican support based on the fact 
that producers and workers threatened by imports tend to be concentrated, 
organized and ready to advance their interests in the political arena. On the 
other hand, in the Democratic districts in the South and among business 
leaders, those who benefitted from trade were, and still are, generally diffuse, 
and so they presented limited resistance to the tariff. 
 For a politician who must respond to concentrated interests (against 
free trade), a vote for lowering trade barriers when his/her constituents are 
suffering and facing strong competition is as one former official put it, an 
“unnatural act.”42 However, the restrictive nature of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
to allow the nation, or any nation, to rebound was recognized as being such an 
obstacle and a failed measure that in 1934 the new Democratic  Congress 
passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and started an almost 40-
year trend supporting liberalized trade.  
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Figure I-2 
 
Source: Baily, et al., 1997, p. 312 
For the first time both Democrats and Republicans joined together to 
fight for the same path on trade, opening America back up to growth and 
prosperity in the post bust era, and allowing the United States to be a linchpin 
in the allied success in World War II.  
With the break out of World War II, the trend that is widely visible in 
Table I-1 seemed to come to an end. Beginning with the wartime growth of 
government in the middle and late 1940s and early 50s, Republicans began to 
see that supporting the liberal framework was in their best interests as it 
furthered the Republican ideas of being skeptical about government 
intervention into the economy. While it would seem that the Democrats would 
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have been moving in the opposite direction as they increased government 
intervention during the new deal and World War II period, the Democrats 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s continued to maintain their traditional support 
of low tariffs and trade liberalization. This was interesting to look at seeing 
that the pressure from the Southern Democrat’s districts was in favor of 
moving toward greater intervention as the increased competition threatened 
the south’s major economic exports. This failure to make the logical policy 
decisions on trade began to cause a shift in the southern representatives. 
However, the shift that had been long awaited, and was seemingly always just 
around the corner, took a back seat for the next 30 years, and trade did not 
again become a major point of contention between the parties until the mid to 
late 1960s. 
Trade in the in post WWII era was not high on people’s lists of 
concerns. This gave politicians an extremely high amount of liberty to pursue 
the policies that they deemed necessary. Democrats and Republicans alike 
witnessed firsthand how protectionist policies caused the Great Depression to 
linger far longer than it should have. They had seen the potential that lies in 
liberalized trade in that while the rest of the developed world was fighting and 
their industrial capabilities were either maxed out or being destroyed, the 
United States was doing the opposite, building capacity and production to 
levels never seen before. Liberal trade policies were also buttressed by the 
need to combat Communism. The United States quickly realized that poor, 
shattered countries that had starving, unemployed people based on the 
46 
 
  
outcome of World War II were breeding grounds for Communist sympathy. 
Massive financial and industrial aid was sent to Europe - the Marshall Plan - 
so that they could rebuild and start trading with us again. Not to mention, the 
United States was securely on the top for the first time, and throughout the 
world, there was no country able to rival its production capacity. The United 
States was prosperous and was pumping out the supplies and materials needed 
to rebuild in Europe, and thusly, the jobs remained after World War II.43 With 
the American public, for all intensive purposes disinterested in international 
trade, a booming economy whose unemployment remained low, and a, 
relatively speaking, unvocal labor union sector, liberal trade became the best 
plan for America, even if it disparately affected groups of people, a condition 
that would eventually lead to the erosion of the liberal trade juggernaut.  
However, as would seem obvious, such an advantage could not and 
did not last long. American anxiety about foreign completion grew as the 
relative position of the U.S. declined. The striking success of nations like 
Japan sowed seeds of doubt about the liberal doctrine. In this environment, 
many Americans became skeptical of the liberal image of a world growing 
more and more open, barraged with increased global competition, and 
increasingly controlled by common rules of nondiscrimination in trade. “What 
they came to see was an ‘unfair’ world where other nations played loose with 
the rules and ‘nice guys’ were likely to finish last.”44 As Europe and Japan 
quickly rebounded from the devastation of WWII, American businesses began 
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to face increased competition at a time when the value of the dollar was so 
high it made American products even less competitive when compared to 
cheaper foreign goods.  
While America as a whole remained prosperous and growing, labor 
unions began to become more vocal in the second half of the century. By the 
1970s, they were making increased demands of both the system and 
politicians. The labor unions were kept at bay, at least temporarily, when, in 
1953, Trade Adjustment Assistance was formulated in the Randall 
Commission by Donald McDonald of the United Steelworkers Union. 
Although the commission rejected it, the idea was picked up by a group of 16 
senators, one being John Kennedy.  The adoption of TAA and its subsequent 
push for passage allowed Democrats to protect their labor base and at the 
same time continue to promote trade liberalization. Where at one time this 
could be done together, that time had passed and would not return again, 
especially today when trade liberalization is considered an evil process among 
most union leaders.  
Another method deployed by labor unions and politicians alike was 
“special cases.” In the post-war period, the most important and vocal special 
case was the textile industry — an industry that was always vulnerable to 
international competition. The textile industry, representing 2.5 million 
workers and located in every state in the United States, wielded a large 
amount of power in politics.45 Appeasing the textile industry became a 
required aspect of the Democrat’s platform on trade. Giving in to textile 
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interests by adopting textile specific protectionist measures allowed the 
Democrats to continue to push a liberal trade agenda, but also save face in 
their Southern districts. Much like the Buy America provisions that have come 
to be argued today, they gave American firms who otherwise would lose out, 
even in their home markets, the ability to compete and win against foreign 
companies who made their products cheaper.  
This tactic of working the South to garner support or at least stave off 
rebellion was used throughout the post-war period. President Kennedy 
continued this trend when he appeased the Southern cotton region in the 1960s 
in order to allow the party as a whole to maintain a strong stance for liberal 
trade expansion and vote heavily for Kennedy’s Trade Expansion Act in 1962, 
but maintain support in their districts. The switch for the Democrats toward a 
more protectionist path would not begin until labor unions began to turn out 
and abandon the liberal trade path as being the most advantageous for the 
future, both in terms of employment and prosperity for the workers that they 
represented. This movement toward promoting greater intervention and 
protection would not officially take flight until the late 1960s after the 
Democratic Party made a historic movement to the Northern states with the 
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960.46 This policy change from the unions 
began to sway the northern Democrats who now made up the bulk of the 
party, and thus the party priorities on trade began to move in a different 
direction. 
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B. The Increasing Politicization of Trade in the Post War Period 
 
For a long time after World War II, American trade policy was 
strongly aligned with advancing liberal trade policies. International trade was 
viewed as not a very political topic, as it would grow to be by the end of the 
century and into the current elections. While the parties did compete for the 
support of important constituencies that favored certain trade positions, there 
was without question, an overwhelming consensus in support of expanding 
trade and reducing barriers to trade among members of Congress. The general 
public, although tending toward protectionism, was largely disinterested in 
trade politics which allowed politicians to have free reign to support and 
propose further liberal trade expansion as they did not have to fear not being 
reelected based on their trade views, a condition that would change.  
While some industries, namely manufacturing sectors such as textiles, 
steel, shoes, and many other small manufacturers which were already 
beginning to face strong foreign competition, supported protectionist policies, 
most American manufacturing and labor interests were largely not active on 
trade issues. Although, they remained available to act on trade if an issue 
arose that threatened them. However all of this changed in the 1970s and 
1980s — turning trade into a political issue with stronger lobbying efforts. 
  
While Democrats were taking advantage of the opportunity to tap into 
the public sentiment of protectionism for electoral gains, the Republicans 
toughened their trade stances.  In the business sector, international 
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competition was presenting a problem as cheaper goods from Japan and other 
heavy exporting countries flooded the market based on the imbalance in 
exchange rates where the strong dollar led to a drop in exports and a huge 
spike in imports, which then led to the huge trade deficits that continue today 
(see figure I-3). 
 
Figure I-3 
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The trade explosion saw a drastic increase in both imports and exports; 
however, imports to the United States exploded beyond exports creating an 
ever-growing trade imbalance. Exports and imports rose from $19.7 billion 
and $14.8 billion respectively in 1960 to $1.16 trillion and $2.02 trillion 
respectively in 2007, creating a trade deficit of just under $855 billion. 
However, throughout this period, US manufacturing and producers of 
consumer goods suffered greatly. Since the individuals and workers, most 
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heavily in these two sectors, who lose from increased trade have a much 
greater incentive to organize and actively promote a more protectionist trade 
stance than do people who are befitting, the role, energy and influence of 
unions became a stronger force as America continued to shed manufacturing 
jobs while the trade deficit expanded.48  
Labor unions, like the AFL-CIO, continued to make a transition away 
from liberalization of trade practices and their stances began to grow much 
more protectionist based on the changing landscape of manufacturing and 
American business, as well as the growing trade imbalance. All of these 
factors led Democratic legislators, the populous, and labor unions to start 
questioning the longstanding concept that international trade was better off 
without government control. While the turn on trade seemed inevitable, it was 
slow and very sporadic within sectors. Labor unions would almost all, 
eventually, begin to stand up and fight for protectionist measures, but the 
automotive sector in the late 1960s and even early 1970s was still thriving and 
doing well, despite the fact that everyone could see the rising Japanese 
automotive industry as a threat, and so it was by the end of the 1970s. 
 
C. From Support for the Kennedy Round to a Growth in Protectionism 
 
The split between the parties was obvious in the Kennedy Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 when, in the House alone Democrats voted 210 to 44 
in support of liberalizing trade relations, while Republicans voted to kill the 
bill by a vote of 127 to 43. This basic split on trade with the Republicans 
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generally opposing liberalized trade and Democrats lining up to support it was 
very consistent with the prior three decades beginning in 1930 with the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. 
Generally speaking, Democrats aligned to support liberal trade practices and 
the reduction of trade barriers and Republicans fought to increase 
protectionism in an attempt to shelter American businesses and industry.49 
While labor unions supported the Kennedy Round of tariff cutting, by the time 
the legislation passed in 1967, textile manufacturers and steel workers were 
demanding protection from increasing European and Japanese competition — 
mainly because the value of the US dollar was so strong that it was unfairly 
favoring import goods over exports, which hurt the U.S. producers while 
giving a big boost to foreign competition. Unions began calling for “orderly 
expansion of U.S. trade”50 .  
The change from the 1960s was dramatic and visible, and heavily 
influenced by regional representation, especially in the Democratic Party. 
Only a decade after the Kennedy trade expansion, the House voted much 
differently when a new trade round was introduced in 1973. The Democrat’s 
constituency and thus platform switch was clear in their 121-112 vote against 
the liberalizing round. Republicans almost universally voted to approve the 
round by a vote of 160-19.  
The switch on trade in the Democratic Party was driven by Northern 
Democrats based on changing the fact that their constituencies, heavily 
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industrial and manufacturing based, who had once benefited greatly from 
liberal trade were now suffering from increased competition. In 1962 
Northern Democrats supported the Kennedy round 141 to 7, but by 1973 they 
voted 101 to 52 against opening another trade liberalizing round. 
While some of the reasons behind this vote might be due to the 
different parties in power in the White House (Democrats voted with the 
Democrat, President Kennedy, in 1962 and against President Nixon, a 
Republican, in 1973), claiming that it was more than a minor cause would 
discredit the transformation that was beginning between the two parties 
stances on trade. One of the most important factors behind the turnaround was 
the switch in geographic bases of the parties.51  Throughout the first half of 
the century, the base of the Republican Party was in the Northeast and 
Midwest industrial centers. From the time of the election of Abraham Lincoln 
until FDR, no Democratic presidential candidate carried Pennsylvania or 
Michigan. The 1932 election was very telling when Hoover did not win a 
single state west of Pennsylvania or south of Delaware. However, this all 
changed in the 1960 election of President John F. Kennedy. Winning with 303 
electoral votes, he carried Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey 
and since then, the Democrats have claimed hold over the Northeast, and the 
Republican stronghold has shifted to the West and eventually, the South.  
The shift of Republican strongholds to the South and West reduced 
their dependence on the protectionist issues which had helped them win votes 
in the industrial North and Midwest. In the same way, the new Democratic  
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strongholds in the North and Midwest, areas which are the bastion of big 
labor, required Democrats to change their trade views in order to represent 
their new constituency.  
However this change should not have blindsided the trade sector as it 
did. In the 1950s, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter 
analyzed a 1953 Roper poll that showed that 44% of ultra protectionists were 
Democrats, and 46% of ultra liberal traders were Republican. Bauer and his 
colleagues attribute this difference to education level where those with lower 
education levels tended to be protectionist and vote Democratic  while 
professionals with college experience tended to be liberal and vote Republican 
(American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade.52  
Those of the lower education levels tended to work in factories and be a part 
of union labor.  On top of this, Republicans were the party of limited 
government interaction whereas Democrats had, historically, been more open 
to and accepting of a large, powerful central government. So it would seem 
obvious that the party which supported more government would begin to 
favor a protectionist trade policy where there was more control over trade and 
its foreign and domestic elements, while the party who opted for less control 
of government and more freedom for business would move away from the 
protectionist path and align itself with the free traders and liberal trading 
practices which gave businesses more control and leeway. 
 The switch in the support of liberal trade policies by labor unions was 
quite interesting in that it occurred over the course of one decade. Throughout 
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the 1950s and early 1960s, the big labor organizations remained true to their 
free trade platform, however, by the 1970s, the AFL-CIO had started to make 
their change on trade policy. While the organization had accepted and 
campaigned hard for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in 1962 as part of 
the Trade Expansion Act, they were denouncing it in the 1970s.   Due to the 
nature of TAA — providing a payment to those whose jobs were lost due to 
outsourcing or foreign competition or other elements of trade — labor unions 
in the 1970s began attacking TAA by calling it burial insurance. While it did 
help those who were forced out of work, it did not do anything to deal with 
the fact that liberalization of trade and foreign exposure had cost them their 
job. The unfortunate part for trade liberalizing advocates was that the jobs that 
were being lost due to trade were mostly being shed from the industrial 
sectors of the Northeast and Midwest. 
 Due to the location where the jobs were being shed, Northern 
Democrats continued their shift on trade in order to protect their constituents. 
The auto and steel industries were being particularly hit hard leading to a 
profound increase in the force and activity of labor organizations. Certain 
candidates took advantage of the awakening of labor unions and saw this 
emerging condition as a perfect opportunity to pick up electoral support. John 
Connally, who was running on the Republican presidential ticket, made 
international trade one of his top priorities and used the slumping industrial 
sector to drum up support; he was the first candidate to make trade a central 
aspect of his campaign since WWII. While Connally ended up not gaining the 
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support needed at the convention, he did stir some excitement and fervor 
when he made a promise while campaigning in 1979, that he would leave the 
Toyotas to rust on the docks.53 
In the 1980s, major industries in the United States such as textiles and 
automobiles sought further federal actions in the form of restrictions, like 
quotas and antidumping policies. While trade representatives did not agree 
that these industries needed these restrictions in many cases, they were 
powerless to stop it. Congressmen, in an attempt to carry the support of 
important industries in their states, supported this legislation in Congress. 
Although it might have seemed like the trend was unstoppable and that trade 
liberalization was reversing order, Congress as a whole in the 1980s remained 
in favor of liberalization, and members introduced these “protectionist” bills 
knowing that in most cases they would not receive enough support to be 
passed. However, the sheer discussion in Congress helped these Congressman 
gain the support of powerful business and labor interests while also putting 
pressure on the executive branch and foreign governments to steer clear of 
making concessions that would negatively impact these industries.  
 With decreasing sales, an oil crisis and heavy foreign competition 
from Japan, the automobile industry was in a crisis in the early 1980s and saw 
a huge drop in profits to the point where 300,000 of the 1 million works in the 
automobile industry were now unemployed. Ford and GM saw their profits 
sink, and Chrysler needed a government bailout to stay in business.  The 
United Auto Workers (UAW), long time promoters of open trade when the 
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American auto industry was the largest in the world, began to recoil on this 
idea and sought out to impose import restrictions on Japan so that their sales 
could rebound against the flood of cheaper, more fuel-efficient Japanese 
vehicles in 1980s. In 1980, UAW president Douglas Fraser began a campaign 
for “local content legislation.” Two years later with the crisis not getting any 
better and the U.S. auto industry reeling from losses, the UAW pushed for 
domestic content restrictions that required the more cars the company sold in 
the United States the higher the percentage of the value of the car must come 
from the United States. This meant that more of the parts making up Japanese 
cars would be required to have been made in the United States if they were to 
be sold in the United States.  
While the bill’s passage was unlikely, its mere presence caused the 
executive branch and trade officials to begin negotiations with the Japanese to 
limit exports to the America. Following the actions of the unions, 
Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats flocked to the bill and voted almost 
unanimously. Although the bill never reached the Senate floor, the House’s 
support for the measure was enough to warrant an agreement by the Japanese 
to limit exports of automobiles for a time until the American corporations and 
market could rebound. While the issue faded after 1983 when the U.S. auto 
industry rebounded, it was clear that the Northeastern and Midwestern 
Democrats remained true to their new base of support in the labor unions, 
moving at whim based on their needs at any given moment.54  
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As trade became a more salient issue and it became clear that the 
American economy was growing too dependent on international trade, 
Congressional interest in the topic soared, and floor debates and discussions 
went from being rare and mostly ceremonial to drive home a specific point or 
influence the president or foreign power, to a common occurrence. “Between 
1975 and 1980, by one measure, the frequency of House and Senate floor 
references to trade went up 70%.”55 According to the Congressional Research 
Service, the number of trade restrictive bills also began to climb from 127 in 
the 96th Congress (1979-80) to 144 in the 98th.56 The increase in trade-related 
measures corresponded directly to the increase in trade, specifically on the 
import side of the equation.  
The rise in imports was likely due in part to the strength of the U.S. 
dollar, which helped foreign competition enter into the American market like 
never before while simultaneously hampering American production. In the 
mid-1980s the price of the U.S. dollar rose 40% above the level needed for 
American businesses to stay competitive and the trade balance fell to the point 
where imports rose more than 50% above exports. The U.S. trade deficit hit 
100 billion and kept growing.57 This rise in the trade deficit coupled with the 
continued decline in American manufacturing caused both parties to seek to 
protect American businesses and, most importantly for the Democrats, 
American labor. Trade protectionism in the 1980-84 Congresses increased 
drastically. Gary Clyde Hufbauer has calculated that, “U.S. imports covered 
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by special protection, including increasing tariffs and quota restrictions, rose 
from 12% of total imports in 1980 to 21% in 1984.”58 These protectionist 
measures allowed the currency imbalance to correct itself while protecting 
American worker and companies in the process. In the second half of the 
1980s, the trade deficit began to decline as trade exploded, doubling in 
magnitude from 1986 to 1992. By 1991, the trade deficit had fallen below the 
all important $100 billion mark and American businesses looked to further 
trade expansion under the more favorable climate. However, the majority of 
Democrats remained skeptical of expanding trade on the basis that while 
American business stood to gain, American labor was assuredly losing 
ground.  
The Republicans started to become concerned about how their stance 
on trade would affect the midterm elections in 1986. In 1985, they had lost an 
open Congressional seat when the Democrats blamed the Republican for 
supporting imports that cost Americans their jobs. In the summer of 1986, 
three prominent centrist Democrats, Sen. Lloyd Bentson of Senate Finance, 
and Rep. Dan Rostenkowshi and Rep. Richard Gephardt of House Ways and 
Means, had cosponsored a bill imposing surcharges on the countries that had 
the largest trade surpluses — with the United States.59 Trade regained 
momentum in the midterm elections in 1986 when the Democrats picked up 
eight seats in the Senate, tipping the balance of power toward their party. The 
West Virginia senator, and majority leader of the new Democratically 
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controlled Senate, Bentson, wasted no time in declaring that trade would be a 
top priority for the party in 1987-88.  
With the Democrats in control of the Senate, the Reagan 
administration could no longer fall on the balance in the senate to stop the 
protectionist measure which had been flowing out of the Democratically 
controlled House for the past few Congresses. The Omnibus Trade Act which 
had failed in the previous Congress had been given new life through this 
change, much to the chagrin of liberalized trade supporters and the Reagan 
administration. The bill, HR 3, was a rehashing of the previous bill passed by 
the House in 1986 that was vetoed by President Reagan. The bill did not 
include any product specific protections, and did not include textiles which 
would be included in a later bill, passed the House on April 30, 1987 with a 
vote of 290 to 137; fourty-three Republicans joined in an almost unanimous 
Democratic vote. The Senate the Finance committee reported out a bill in 
early may with broad bipartisan support, 19 to 1. After a month of debate and 
merging all of the separate committee versions together, the omnibus bill 
passed the Senate by a vote of 71 to 27.  
However, exterior events would change the bill’s course. While in 
Conference Committee, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell over 500 points 
in one day, “Black Monday,” causing the conferees to tred lightly and rethink 
the 1000 plus pages of legislation that lay before them. Conferences on the 
market decline lasted until December, putting trade off of the docket until 
1988. Seeing that the markets were jumpy, Congressional leaders, including 
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Rostenkowski and Bentson, began to turn their focus onto drafting a bill that 
the president would sign. This sentiment of change flowed into the rest of the 
conference when the House conferees proposed dropping all of the provisions 
that were directly trade restrictive, and the Senate later agreed.  
With the removal of the trade restrictive elements, HR 3 passed both 
Houses, but was eventually vetoed by President Reagan who cited one of his 
reasons as the labor-backed clause regarding notification prior to plant 
closings. The Democrats were unable to gain an override vote in the Senate, 
falling 5 votes short. However, with organized labor’s push to get the bill 
passed, a new bill was drafted and named HR 4848. It was identical to HR 3, 
without the plant-closing clause and an Alaskan oil clause that had been cited 
as a reason behind Reagan’s veto. To the delight of organized labor interests, 
and as part of the Democrats plan to get the major aspects of the old bill 
passed, the plant-closings clause was introduced as a separate bill. With 
outpouring support and advocacy spurred by labor interests, both bills passed 
the House and Senate by overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Although 
against the plant closings bill, but facing the prospect of being pegged as 
“antiworker,” Reagan allowed the bill to become law without his signature. 
As for HR 4848, Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 into law on August 23rd.60 
Of all the Democratic  contenders and activists in the 1980s, Sen. Walter 
Mondale (D-MN), made trade and its effects on labor a central part to his 
campaign for president in the run up to the 1984 general election. Mondale 
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desperately needed the power of the labor union on his side and to put all of 
their assets toward helping him win. In order to do this, he took a protectionist 
stance, more so when speaking in front of a labor crowd. While Mondale was 
careful never to fully commit to specific protectionism or tie himself to doing 
specific things, he was quick to attack the Japanese for their unfair trade 
practices and denounced the Reagan administration’s handling of the issue 
when speaking to labor organizations. Mondale, who at the time was 
vigorously courting the endorsement of the AFL-CIO, said in the run up to the 
Democratic  primary in 1984 that the United States needed to get tough on 
trade or else job opportunities for its youth would be limited to working at 
McDonald’s or sweeping up around Japanese computers.61   However it was 
clear that, 50 years after the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement in 
1934, the transition of the Democratic Party was becoming more locked as 
only two Northeast and Midwest Democrats voted against the United Auto 
Workers litmus test, the domestic content bill in 1984. 
While it was a major change from how the party had voted for much of 
the 1900s, the Democratic Party’s switch was never complete; a fact that 
remains true today and is an important aspect of why trade policy remains 
contentious and moving on a rather undecided track even with a filibuster-
proof majority in the Senate, a Democratic  president and a substantial hold on 
the House. While a strong stance on trade in favor of labor and against trade 
liberalization helped Senator Harris Wofford (D-PA) win a surprise victory in 
the 1991 Pennsylvania special election and Richard Gephardt (D-MO) win the 
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Iowa caucuses in 1988, a protectionist stance on trade hurt several 
candidates.62 During their campaigns for president, Mondale and Gephardt 
found out the hard way that they had to tread lightly while speaking about 
protectionism, even when their party seemed to be moving more and more in 
that direction. Editorialists and Democratic  competitors attacked their 
protectionist platforms for their adverse effects on international appeal and 
economic effects. The sole exception to protectionist criticism was Japan and 
the fear of the growth of South East Asia. Japan, for much of the late 1900s, 
was an easy target for politicians, as the vast majority of Americans saw Japan 
as being unfair to the United States. In a 1988 Gallup poll (see results below) 
1300 Americans were asked, “Do you think the following trading partners are 
fair or unfair to the United States when it comes to trade?” While Canada and 
Western Europe received a plurality of responses claiming that their trade was 
fair, Japan was not viewed so kindly. With an overwhelming 65% of 
responses in accord, trade with Japan was seen as unfair and harmful for the 
United States.  
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Source: Gallup Poll, May 1, 1988 
 
The Democratic Party was also fractured along power lines.  The more 
powerful chairmen and party leaders maintained their support for trade 
liberalization, while the newly elected and less senior members of the party 
trended, along with the base of the Democratic Party toward greater support of 
a protectionist trade regime. The House Ways and Means Committee, the 
group in charge of trade related issues in the House, Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-IL) maintained his longtime support of free trade as did his 
counterpart in the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentson (D-
TX). Both men, along with the House and Senate Leadership, broke away 
from their party when they supported Fast Track trade negotiating authority 
for President Bush during NAFTA negotiations. Some Democrats decided to 
sit the fence in this inter-party tug of war over which side would eventually 
prevail and when. Gephardt, upon being elected as the new House majority 
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leader in 1991, voted in support of Fast Track, even though he had fought it 
before he was in a leadership role. Later in 1991, he introduced an amendment 
with the purpose of singling out and attacking Japan for their large trade 
imbalance with the United States.  
 
D. Trade Polarization and Labor Conflict in the 1990s: NAFTA and its 
Effects 
 
Democrats and Republicans alike had signed onto the idea that liberal 
trade policies were the correct progression for the United States in dealing 
with an increasingly globalized world. However, with the trade events and the 
currency fluxuations of the 1980s, by the 1990s, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that trade was going to be a contentious political issue. The 1990s saw a 
reemergence of the trade conflicts that existed in the 1950s as legislators 
began to consider the individual provisions and limitations of the legislation, 
specifically its implications to the increasingly important labor unions and 
sensitive manufacturing as being more important than the passage of the bill 
itself. Whereas the benefit of the nation and of the greater good had a 
significant pull during the pre-polarized years, beginning in the late 1970s and 
only becoming increasingly intense during the 1990s and even more so after 
the turn of the century, trade was no longer and economic issue; politics was 
once again king. 
The juxtaposition of the two most critical pieces of trade legislation in 
the early 1990s illustrates the degree to which differences between parties had 
eroded — an implicit agreement beginning in the 1950s and lasting 
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throughout the 1970s was that both parties would support broad trade 
agreements while battling over the specifics of the legislation. The two bills 
were the 1993-94 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations for the GATT in1994. While both 
represented trade liberalizing measures, the bitter battle for the inclusion of 
strict labor and environmental provisions in the NAFTA legislation brought 
about war over its passage whereas the Uruguay Round, which avoided such 
discussions, drew support from both sides of the isle, yet still faced some 
opposition. This difference in responses to two trade liberalizing measures 
shows the importance of the labor debate to the American political climate.63 
In terms of labors role in trade, there was no stronger emergence of the 
movement into the forefront of American policy than in the 1990s NAFTA 
debates and their trade liberalization aftermath. Many trade policy historians 
agree, such as Destler who wrote, in his subdued tone, that, “The early 1990s 
were big years for American trade policy.”64 The decade began with a very 
contentious debate over the passage of Fast Track negotiating authority, the 
passage of which was a critical requirement that had the ability to make the 
NAFTA agreement impossible. The pressure to institute and quicken trade 
liberalization in the United States came directly from American businesses. 
The trade situation became increasingly favorable to American based 
corporations as the dollar index fell; subsequently, the trade deficit finally 
decreased below $100 billion, promping American business to demand 
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increased opportunities to take advantage of this favorability by opening up 
markets.  
In addition, a new concept was beginning to be felt around the world 
and strongly in the United States among American manufacturing — labor 
mobility. Much of the NAFTA debate, as far as organized labor organizations 
are concerned, revolved around the increasingly important and globalization 
driven concept of labor mobility, also known as outsourcing. Labor mobility 
is defined as the ability to move jobs around the country and around the globe 
in order to take advantage of different business environments which offer 
more favorable production scenarios for a company.  In the increasingly 
globalized world of the early 1990s, this business maneuver threatened to 
expand. American labor knew that with cheaper labor in Asia and, more 
importantly for NAFTA, in our neighbor Mexico, they had to make a stand 
against Fast Track negotiating authority and focus efforts against NAFTA or 
else their constituents would most assuredly be at risk. 
Fast Track renewal was a pivotal first step for the Bush administration 
which was trying to tie up the NAFTA legislation, all the while knowing that 
it would likely reside with the next administration to decide whether NAFTA 
would pass or fail. Senators Bentson and Rostenkowski, who were both 
supporters of the Fast Track authority renewal, wrote to President Bush asking 
him for guarantees on three major issues before they would push hard for 
renewal. The three issues they saw as being necessary to any argument on the 
NAFTA trade deal and that would be pivotal in getting Democrats to consider 
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the bill were: the overall economic impact of NAFTA, the effects that the 
legislation might have on jobs and worker’s rights, and its impact on the 
environment.65 Organized labor interests were particularly worried about 
having a free trade agreement with a “low-wage” neighbor and questioned the 
effects that it might have on the already hard struck and dwindling 
manufacturing sector in the United States. Senator Gephardt tried to approach 
the NAFTA deal with an open mind, and stated that he was undeclared; 
however, the strong labor forces that were working behind the scenes forced 
him to also write a letter to President Bush with similar concerns.  
The labor unions were out hard and strong on the NAFTA issue, and 
as had become the norm for powerful organized labor, they refused to 
compromise. They were making a huge stand while business interests, 
lobbyists and pro-traders lagged just enough behind to put them at a 
disadvantage in the beginning. Trying to resist organized labor and equalize 
the field, Bentson and Rostenkowski pushed hard for business leaders to start 
making a move, and it wasn’t long until the pro-trade coalition that had ruled 
for so long, but had been in decline during the Reagan deficit years, was back 
in business and pushing hard. “Bentson and Rowstenkowski declared their 
satisfaction with the White House response. On 9 May Gephardt declared his 
support with a “caveat: If the administration sends to this Congress a trade 
treaty that trades away American jobs, or … (allows the) abuse of (foreign) 
workers, we can, and we will, amend it, or reject it.”66 When President Bush’s 
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Fast Track authority pertaining to NAFTA arose as a topic of consideration, 
the votes came down in both a partisan and regional manner. Democrats in the 
House voted overwhelmingly against the Fast Track measure, 170 to 91, 
although the leadership in the House supported Fast Track authority (a trend 
which would repeat itself during the George W. Bush administration). 
“Republicans were overwhelmingly positive about the NAFTA negotiations; 
Clinton’s party was divided but leaning against, as reflected in House 
Democrats’ 170-91 vote against Fast Track in May 1991.”67 Regionally, the 
states with the highest Latino populations (California, Florida, and Texas) 
voted 64-24 in favor of Fast Track, likely due to the fact that with a Fast Track 
victory, the passage of NAFTA was greatly assisted. It should be noted that 
the Fast Track battle laid the ground work for the NAFTA battle as it brought 
out the special interests that would remain in top performance throughout the 
NAFTA debate. Even though the protrude interests were slower to rise up and 
counter the protectionist forces, when they did finally emerge, they came out 
strong, opening up the checkbooks to succeed.68  
Although NAFTA was negotiated under the George H. W. Bush 
Administration, its passage and effects would become a true facet and battle 
for the Clinton administration. Clinton, the first Democrat in over a decade, 
came into office with huge trade concerns. He was forced to immediately 
decide whether to make void all of the efforts of the previous administration 
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in terms of NAFTA, or to support and appease his organized labor 
constituency by either amending the agreement or dropping it all together.  
However, Clinton’s position on NAFTA was hidden at first. In 
October 1992, before he was elected in November, Clinton came out strong 
for NAFTA, endorsing it and rejecting the idea the agreement needed to be 
renegotiated in a speech leading up to the election. However, he did protect 
his interests by declaring that the current NAFTA draft was insufficient in 
dealing with the environment, worker standards and the threat of import 
surges.69 Even when he entered office, there was still room to question 
whether he was going to be pro-trade with the strong backing of American 
business and special interests or whether he was going to side with his 
organized labor-funded party.  In his initial months, Clinton gave free trade 
speech in February 1993, and in March he appeared to be supporting a steep 
rise in tariffs on minivan imports. In April, he appeared to revert back the 
protectionist leanings of his party when he chose organizational appointments 
which put him on board with managed trade—he chose a “cautious trade” 
activist, Laura Tyson, as the chair of his Council of Economic Advisors. This 
appointment was a shock as his predecessors, among both parties, had 
historically appointed traditional free trade advocates to this position.70 
Clinton entered office with the promise that he would pass NAFTA 
with, and only with, enhanced side agreements for labor and the environment. 
However, in the administration as a whole, he took a lot of risks surrounding 
                                                 
69
 Deslter, 2005, p. 198 
70
 Destler, 2005, p. 199 
71 
 
  
the agreement. After looking at the proceedings surrounding President 
Obama’s approach to both the stimulus package and the healthcare bill, it 
seems weird that President Clinton supported and prompted members of his 
own party to make any comments that they deemed as necessary in terms of 
the NAFTA debate, especially before the side agreements had been worked 
out. Many observers saw this as the fact that the Clinton Administration was 
supportive of trade but trying to simultaneously protect the organized labor 
backing of Democratic  elected officials. However, Bob Woodward thought 
that Clinton’s early approach to NAFTA was a bad sign for the agreement. In 
a book he wrote about the Clinton White House he wrote, “…the odds were 
that the Clinton administration would abandon NAFTA because the labor 
groups opposed it.”71  
Clinton’s chosen United States Trade Representative (USTR) Mickey 
Kantor, who entered the position with a blank record on trade, thought 
otherwise, saying, “that if Clinton fought for Congressional approval of the 
treaty and won despite the opposition of labor and of some members of the 
House leadership, it would be a big plus for him. He would have stood up and 
fought a bipartisan fight.”72 However, some members of his party resented 
this action and it left plenty of room for organized labor and for the engaging 
businessman, a political newcomer in 1992, Ross Perot, to join in the trade 
debate. 
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 Clinton’s pro-NAFTA stance was attacked outright before he took office 
as well. Ross Perot’s ideas, which were popularized in his 1992/1996 
presidential election runs, stand out as the most significant opposition. Perot 
busted into the public scene as a wealthy businessman who could successfully 
appeal to the thoughts and ideas of middle class America. He is important to 
point out because it was his campaign in 1992 which took on the role of 
almost being like the electoral voice of organized labor and their constituents. 
As an Independent, he belonged to neither political side, but his trade ideas 
fell almost squarely with the most left-leaning of the Democratic Party. 
 Although, in a Larry King Live debate with Al Gore, Perot declared 
himself to be a free-trader, his book, entitled Save Your Job, Save Our 
Country: NAFTA Must Be Stopped Now!, speaks to the contrary. In his book, 
he wrote that NAFTA would create “a giant sucking sound” and would mean 
the “loss of millions of jobs” which would be pulled Southward over the 
border to Mexico in order to take advantage of the cheap labor and poorly 
enforced labor standards. He brought the argument to America’s doorstep 
stating that no less than one-third of all U.S. manufacturing employment (six 
million of the 18 million total jobs) would be at risk if NAFTA passed.73 With 
his successful campaign in 1992, garnering 18% of the popular vote and 
taking an even 38% of the vote away from both Clinton and Bush, Perot was 
the most successful third party candidate since Teddy Roosevelt and forced 
the Clinton Administration to protect itself by amending its platform to better 
protect its middle-class constituents who were now fearful of the labor effects 
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of NAFTA.74 However, as can be seen in the results, shown below, in a 
Gallup poll conducted April 4, 1991, the majority of Americans still supported 
NAFTA as being beneficial for the United States.  
 
Source: Gallup Poll      Date: Apr. 4, 199175 
While the Clinton Administration supported NAFTA and outlined its 
benefits to American businesses and society as a whole, organized labor 
interests threw their weight against the agreement. The Clinton administration 
praised NAFTA, saying that it would lead to the creation of hundreds of 
thousands of well-paying American jobs and that it would expand the U.S. 
economy by $100-$200 billion per annum. 76 To a large degree this has been 
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vindicated as NAFTA has greatly expanded U.S. trade between Canada and 
Mexico.  
However, labor organizations, who represented the workers who were 
most likely to lose their jobs and lacked the skills to attain the “well-paying” 
jobs NAFTA would create, were not blinded by this economic growth 
potential. Organized labor supplied the muscle to the anti-NAFTA side of the 
argument. With their membership in great decline and wages and productivity 
falling proportionally every year on end the unions and their constituents saw 
the opening of trade with Mexico as a serious threat that should be considered 
as an immediate concern. The AFL-CIO, America’s second largest union but 
easily the most politically charged on trade and outsourcing concerns, and its 
member unions approached many of the Democratic  Congressmen who 
remained on the fence or in favor of NAFTA to make a stand against the 
agreement, making it clear that NAFTA was going to be considered as a test 
of legislators fidelity to worker’s and labor’s causes. The lobbying by labor 
unions caused enough Congressmen to sign onto the anti-NAFTA side that 
Clinton’s Budget Director, Leon Panetta, declared NAFTA, “dead in the 
water.”77  
The Democratic leadership was split on the NAFTA vote. Similar to 
the Fast Track vote, it soon became clear that the real battle for passage of the 
NAFTA legislation was going to be in the House. While Speaker Thomas 
Foley (D-WA) supported the bill, if not enthusiastically, Majority Leader 
Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) was leaning against the bill and Majority Whip 
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David Bonior (D-Mich), the number three Democrat in the House, outright 
opposed it. Bonior and Gephardt were concerned by the lack of worker’s right 
provisions and by the obvious incentives that the legislation gave to 
employers to outsource both their labor and their operations to Mexico. When 
labor and the environment side agreements were finally agreed upon, the run 
to the end had begun, and labor was still in opposition. 
Upon the passage of the side agreements, the administration pushed 
hard to get NAFTA passed. On September 14, 1993 President Clinton invited 
three former presidents, from both parties, to the White House in order to talk 
about the NAFTA agreement. In a speech delivered the same day, President 
Clinton pointed to the recent global trade and economic changes saying that 
NAFTA or no NAFTA, “the debate about NAFTA centers on whether we will 
embrace these changes and create the jobs of tomorrow, or try to resist these 
changes, hoping that we can preserve the economic structures of yesterday.”78 
The administration insisted that NAFTA was the way forward and that it 
would create U.S. jobs while buttressing global competitiveness. However, 
proving that to his fellow Democrats was a far more difficult task, and the 
Republicans were demanding that the Democrats produce 100 “yea” votes, 
nine more than the amount that responded positively to Fast Track. 79 
However, the administration was running into a brick wall, a wall 
formed by organized labor. With the strong push by labor unions, Clinton was 
finding it difficult to meet with legislators who were willing to make a stand 
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to support NAFTA, causing Clinton to lash out at labor unions.  However, 
Clinton saw that he needed to get at least some labor unions on board in order 
to win over enough Democrats to allow passage. The administration decided 
to focus on the easier to appease car manufacturers and textiles, two groups 
which as we have seen have been targeted in the past as well. The big three 
automakers won a 62.5% North American content requirement which made it 
more difficult for foreign automakers to produce in Mexico or Canada and 
simply ship into the U.S. market without any restraints. This was particularly 
directed at Japan whose auto industry had been the brunt of many quotas and 
tariffs. Textiles won similar protections as they were given during the 
Kennedy Round. The reward for textiles support was the “triple 
transformation test” which meant that the fabric had to be produced in North 
America, from North American-produced yarn which was made from North 
American grown fibers. 80   
After the inclusion of these provisions, Clinton was able to secure the 
necessary votes for passage. The final NAFTA vote was 234-200, and the 
breakdown was 102 Democrats and 132 Republicans in support. The reason 
that the Democrats were able to pick up the extra 11 votes was almost entirely 
due to the inclusion of the “cotton Democrats”. These 11 swing votes came 
primarily from Southern Democrats who were in textile heavy districts, 
making the fiber agreement pivotal to the passage of NAFTA. Another pivotal 
aspect, which allowed some labor interests to get behind NAFTA, was the 
inclusion of adjustment aide to displaced workers and a promise that the 
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administration would work hard to enforce Mexico’s lacking labor standards. 
However, the side agreement lacked any true enforcement mechanism, 
meaning that people continue to criticize the side agreement saying that it 
lacked teeth. “By contrast, under NAFTA’s side agreement on labor, 
complaints about freedom of association in trade sectors can trigger an 
investigations and ministerial consultations, but there is no provision for an 
independent expert committee to resolve and issue or for any sanction if a 
complaint is verified.”81 While many continue to attack NAFTA for allegedly 
causing the loss of American jobs, as will be seen in the 2006 and 2008 
elections, NAFTA is the primary reason why Canada and Mexico are the 
number one and two, respectively, trading partners of the United States. 
During the period between 1987 and 2000 the aggregate amount of U.S. trade 
tripled due primarily to the increased trade between the three countries. 
 
V. The Lasting Influence of the 2006, and 2008 Elections? 
 
A. 2006 
 
1. The Election Results 
 
 The 2006 election was a watershed mark in the brief but eventful 
history of fair trade advocacy and represented as great a sea change in 
Congressional party control as the “Republican Revolution” in 1994. If there 
remained anyone who believed that the issue of fair trade and trade in general 
was not a salient topic in the mainstream political culture, they were proven 
wrong by the events of the 2006 midterm election.  
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The 2006 election was the culmination of over 20 years of polarization 
and politicization of the trade issue, starting in late 1970s. Not only was trade 
a salient issue, but in states across the United States, from the Northeast to the 
South, to the hard hit industrial Midwest and the Asian trade gateway that is 
the Western United States, trade was an important point of contention and 
formed the base of several campaign’s platforms which unseated a number of 
well-known anti-fair trade legislators like Ohio’s former Senator Mike 
DeWine, or Pennsylvania’s Rick Santorum. With the Democrats taking back 
control of the House and gaining a strong footing that carried into 2008 in the 
Senate, the concept of free trade without labor requirements or provisions 
embedded in the agreement started a decline, a decline to where and how 
much of a decline still remains to be seen. However, while the transition was 
celebrated and touted by liberal fair trade groups and labor unions across the 
country, it is difficult to pinpoint such monumental policy changes to coincide 
with the Democratic transition. 
 The American public, which has for much of U.S. history favored a 
slightly more protectionist path, in hard hit districts across the country voiced 
their approval of fair trade and in turn, stronger labor rights provisions in trade 
with their 2006 vote. According to the protectionist, fair trade group Public 
Citizen, who did an extensive report on the 2006 election results as far as fair 
trade support is concerned, showed a net increase; meaning that a former free 
trade advocate was beaten in the general election by a fair trade activist, or 
that the empty seat of a retiring free trade proponent was snatched up by a fair 
79 
 
  
trader for 30 seats in the House of Representatives-11 were open-seat pickups, 
and seven Senate seats, of which only one was an open-seat pickup.82  
Ohio was likely the biggest example of a fair trade change in trade 
policy being a strong campaign issue. All of the seats that were open or being 
contested in Ohio were won by fair trade advocates touting a message of a 
change on trade toward the inclusion of labor rights and seeking to bring 
American jobs back home. Candidates in these hard-hit districts, many of the 
most effected being in Ohio and Michigan, used trade heavily in order to press 
their platform of change and hope for a better future where American jobs 
return to this country—a promise that has yet to be proven possible given the 
increasingly interdependent and globalized world.  
Ohio was not the only state that showed to be a strong anti-free trade 
petri dish. The United States has lost over three million jobs in the 
manufacturing sector, representing one in six manufacturing jobs, during the 
NAFTA-WTO decade while at the same time, real wages have stagnated. 
According to a 2006 report by Economic Policy Institute, the state of Ohio, 
itself, has lost a net 50,000 jobs as a result of NAFTA.83 This is the backbone 
of reasons why eight in 10 voters called the economy “very important” to their 
2006 House vote, and of those who said it was “extremely important”, about 
40% were registered Democrats and many more were Independents whose 
vote has been coveted in nearly all recent elections.84 When it came to the 
issue of jobs, nearly all voters said that creating jobs was important for the 
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United States and many were concerned about the loose trade agreements that 
have been negotiated that included little binding labor stipulations and 
allowed businesses to offshore their jobs and turn unheard-of profits at the 
expense of domestic workers.  
Voters view the government as being fundamentally responsible for 
not requiring more from its trading partners, as well as allowing them to 
continue to have little or very lenient labor laws that give other countries a 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, and allowing the off-shoring of jobs 
to continue, if not increase.  Eighty-seven percent of voters were concerned 
about off-shoring jobs, and of those who were concerned, 81% gave the 
government a C, D, or F grade in handling it.85 In another 2006 poll, 71% said 
that they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who spoke about off-
shoring of jobs, trade deficits, and creating jobs, arguments which made up 
the backbone of fair trade Democratic candidate platforms. 86 
2. The Effects of the Election 
While much has been said about the results of the 2006 election, and in 
fact it was a dramatic victory across the board for members of the fair trade 
coalition, it is very unclear if the election has produced any effects as far as 
trade policy. Other than relatively inconsequentially worded arguments and an 
apparent commitment to work on getting labor concessions in the form of a 
requirement for trading partners to at least enforce their current labor laws and 
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to make a concerted effort to push toward the adoption of the five core ILO 
principles, into any and all future trade agreements.87  
The split that exists within the Democratic Party on the issues of trade, 
and specially labor, are still very visible. Among the Democratic  senators and 
representatives there are two sides emerging, the new and recent members of 
the party coalition who tend to be more aligned with the fair trade movement, 
and many longer-term members of Congress who certainly do not align with 
the growing base of their party, like Senator Max Baucus (D-MT.), Speaker of 
the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) 
all support an expanded trade platform.88 It is interesting to see that those who 
are in high-ranking office within the party did not, after the 2006 election, 
coalesce with this burgeoning group of new fair trade Democrats, and with 
few exceptions, maintained the idea that trade is good for all Americans and 
the future of our government. It is these facts that have called into question 
whether the large and growing fair trade core in the Democratic Party will 
actually amount to that drastic of a change in trade policy, or be more 
representative of the times, existing as a symbol rather than a catalyst.  
One of the strongest arguments involving labor and trade was the lack 
of negotiating labor provisions in the FTAs negotiated during the George W. 
Bush administration. This battle created an intense debate in the summer of 
2007 when Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expired. TPA allowed the 
president and the United States Trade Representative to negotiate trade 
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agreements which would be submitted to Congress for a strict up or down 
vote without the possibility of amendments. This is the reason why, under the 
George W. Bush Administration, eight free trade agreements were negotiated 
and passed, and the frameworks for three others -South Korea, Columbia, and 
Panama-were negotiated.  
On May 10th 2007, the second Bush Administration met with 
Democratic and Republican leaders in an attempt to reinvigorate the TPA 
discussion with the hopes of passing an extension of TPA. While there was a 
general consensus among the participants that TPA needed to be reinstated, 
the language on the labor and environmental regulations that should be part of 
future trade agreements was vague at best and did not represent the growing 
fair trade base of the Democratic Party. In a statement about the process, Rep. 
Pelosi distributed a response saying, “Free trade must be fair trade. For that 
reason, the inclusion of basic internationally recognized labor and 
environmental standards in our trade agreements have been long-standing 
Democratic priority. … Last November, Americans voted for a new direction, 
and that includes a right direction on trade-where labor and environmental 
standards are at least as valued as our financial interests.”89 While this may 
have seemed like a victory for the burdensome lag that was developing 
regarding how vast and far reaching the demands should be on our future 
trading partners in terms of worker’s rights, the vague language of the 
agreement and the minor changes to U.S. trade policy that it required left the 
newly elected and past fair trade members feeling like they had not been 
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included in the process. Once again, the powerful Democrats at the top of the 
party had made an agreement out of line with the results of the election even 
thought Speaker Pelosi cited the election results in her speech.  
In the wake of the 2006 election, Democrats proceeded to score only 
limited victories, and in the process, caused a more pronounced split within 
the party. Coming into office with the promise that they were going to change 
the way that trade was done in Washington, the only real changes that were 
felt between 2006 and the 2008 election was the agreement to push for 
stronger labor rights in the form of the adoption and adherence to the general 
principles of the ILO fundamental worker’s rights; a requirement that FTA-
member countries enforce and uphold their labor laws, and the addition of 
labor rights language into the negotiated Peru FTA which passed in late 2007. 
In the process, the split between the two factions in the party became more 
pronounced.  
Even after the addition of the labor amendments, no matter if they 
were as vast as many Democrats hoped for, the final vote on the Peru FTA 
(see appendix I) showed the divide quite possibly better than any other 
document or report could have. In the House, while the vote was 285-132 in 
favor of the amended agreement, the Democrats split in their approval with 
109 supporting the trade promotion agreement and 116 opposing, with eight 
not voting. It is interesting and very telling to point out that the margin within 
the Democratic Party was tighter than the number of members not voting. It is 
more telling that the leadership, Speaker Pelosi, Congressman Rangel-who is 
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in charge of trade in the House, Congressman Hoyer (D-MD), Representative 
Dingell, and Representative Frank (D-MA) (representing five of the six most 
powerful Democrats in the House according to Congress.org’s power 
rankings) voted in favor of the agreement while 16 of the 19 new fair trade 
representatives, who defeated former anti-fair traders, voted against it. 
Going into the 2008 election year, the Democratic Party was split over 
trade and especially over how powerful the labor provisions should be. For the 
party leaders at the top, they demanded labor be a part of the discussion and 
called for increasing labor regulations and laws, but were more willing to not 
require the drastic labor changes that the new members were calling for if it 
meant that an FTA could be passed and put into effect. 
B. 2008 and a New Democratic  President 
If 2006 marked a watershed election on the issue of labor rights in 
trade, than it only lasted two years since the 2008 election was a tsunami. The 
results of the 2008 election are finally being realized, and although the 
changes that come out of the election might be less than originally thought, 
the power and saliency that the issue of labor rights in trading agreements 
commanded during and immediately after the election can still be felt today. 
Not only was trade an issue in both Congressional and the presidential races, 
but it was a winning issue in both. Voters across America went to the polls on 
November 5th, 2008, and by the end of the night, the United States looked 
prepared to follow a new path in terms of trade and a decidedly stricter 
requirement of trading partners on the issue of labor rights.  
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Outsourcing jobs and the failures of NAFTA and other trading 
agreements to help workers in this country maintain their jobs in the face of 
fierce and unfair competition in the developing world was a main focus of 
both politicians and labor organizations. According to the election analysis 
done by Public Citizen, trade was the main focus of over 137 different paid 
advertisements that aired during the election season (only 25 aired in 2006 
which was a marked increase over any of the past elections). Twelve of those 
advertisements were for candidate Obama’s campaign.90  
Beating up on and attacking the NAFTA agreement became the cool 
thing to do and a winning stance when large numbers of workers began 
feeling the pinch of a cooling market heading for economic catastrophe. 
Across the country, Democrats climbed over each other to see who could be 
the most critical of our trading agreements and about how they were going to 
save American jobs by requiring more regulations from our trading partners. 
However, it is unfair to say that only the Democratic Party was attacking 
NAFTA and past failed U.S. agreements. In 18 races, the GOP ran on the 
issues of failed trade and in 14 races both parties ran strongly on fair trade 
(including labor rights) or fairer trade.91 In California’s 52nd District, a 
historically GOP-heavy seat that was being vacated by Rep. Duncan Hunter 
who was an advent fair trader was taken over by, his son, Duncan Hunter Jr., 
who was elected to fill the seat ran on a strong labor rights and fair trade 
platform. Hunter Jr. said on the campaign trail that, “our nation needs to adopt 
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a policy of Fair Trade that encourages the development of overseas markets, 
while protecting our industry and workers from unfair competition from 
countries like China, that flood our market with inferior, sometimes dangerous 
products produced in near-slave labor conditions.”92  
Due to the presidential election, the fight against trade and for labor 
was stronger than ever since; like in 2004, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and 
a few other hard-hit states had the potential to choose the next president. Both 
parties were listening closely. Polling that was done leading up to the 2008 
election showed that a majority of all Americans, including a majority of 
Republicans demand changes to the current path toward unrestricted free 
trade.93 The Democrats however, a party whose opinion on trade has been 
shifting for over 50 years as the base of their party eroded due to globalization 
and foreign competition, came out on top with their commitment to equalize 
the playing field and bring home American jobs.   
However, while there was much talk of amending or completely 
revamping NAFTA in both the 2006 and 2008 elections, there remains a 
question as to whether talk of revamping NAFTA amounts to more than 
election-year stumping. Three-way trade has soared and unemployment in the 
United Sates is substantially lower now than it was 14 years ago — 4.9% in 
January 2008 compared with 6.6% in January 1994. American shoppers have 
benefited from lower prices on imported goods, and U.S.-based multinational 
companies have boosted their competitiveness by whittling production costs. 
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Yet there is growing wariness among the public that the United States 
is giving away more than it's getting. After all, the nation has lost 3.1 million 
manufacturing jobs since 1994, and its trade deficit with Mexico and Canada 
has risen to $138.5 billion in 2008 from $9.1 billion in 1993.94  
It was becoming clear to politicians, at least surrounding the time of 
the election, that promoting free trade with countries that have hopelessly 
unequal labor laws, conditions, and treatment is a losing platform during hard 
times. A Fortune Magazine poll taken Jan. 14-16, 2008 showed that voters 
have clearly identified who they think has won and who has lost within the 
free-trade agenda. Nearly half of those polled believe that the unbalanced 
growth in international trade has made things better for consumers, but 55% 
believe American business has been harmed, and 78% think it has made 
things worse for the American worker.95  
The problem for the Democratic Party is not about how to find a 
salient stance on trade that gets them elected and appeals to the American 
public, they have found that and the 2006 and 2008 elections spell that out 
clearly. It has been a problem with how far they should push without 
jeopardizing the gentle fabric of international trade. To answer this problem 
one could talk at length on any number of issues, but after looking at what has 
come out of the last two elections, where the words “fair trade” and “labor 
rights” seemed to be thrown around so much that they went from wonkish 
jargon to dinner table lingo, the American public is calling for their elected 
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representative to help them make a stand against unequal competition in the 
developing world. The fact that there has been only one trading agreement 
passed since the Democrats took back control of the House shows that 
Congress is treading lightly so as to not scare away potential trading partners, 
but at the same time find a middle ground on labor rights that will suit both 
countries.  
While leaders in the Democratic Party are feeling out how far they can 
push the issue of labor in trade, the newly elected members of both the House 
and Senate are finding out that the more things change the more they stay the 
same. Although there are new names scattered around the Capitol and a 
different party is in complete control of the reigns of policy making in 
Washington, the only real thing that has happened on the issue of labor in 
trading agreements this decade is the 2002 Trade Act and the May 10th 
agreement with their commitments to place labor requirements in all new 
trade agreements with enforcement mechanisms, as well as a recent slowdown 
in the process of FTA making. The slowdown likely signals that USTR Kirk 
and Congressional leaders on trade are discussing ways to amend the 
proposed agreements so that a majority Democratic Congress would be able to 
support them. The deals with Panama, Columbia, and South Korea will be 
passed during the Obama presidency, but without major changes to the labor 
section of the Columbia FTA and a strong and honest commitment on part of 
Columbian President Uribe, the measure will stall and it may take much 
longer than trade advocates would like. 
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C. How will President Obama Effect the Role of Labor Rights in Trade? 
 
1. Candidate Obama and the road to the White House 
 
President Barack Obama is apparently learning the delicate flip-flog 
maneuver as he now is changing his tune on some of the things that he said 
during the campaign trail and especially in the primary slugfest with now 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Both Democratic  candidates had far 
reaching demands of American trading partners and international commerce 
in general during the primary in terms of labor rights and the plight of 
American manufacturing. Then candidate Obama was very outspoken about 
his plans to introduce labor rights into all future and pending trade 
agreements. "We'll add binding obligations to protect the right to collective 
bargaining and other core labor standards recognized by the International 
Labor Organization. And I will add enforceable standards to NAFTA, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), CAFTA, and other Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) currently in effect."96  
At a General Motors plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, in February 2008, 
Obama said he, "will not sign another trade agreement unless it has 
protections for our environment and protections for American workers" 
(Council of Foreign Relations, #15492).  Candidate Obama and candidate 
Clinton both fought, like many Congressional candidates, over whose attacks 
on NAFTA were strongest and most critical of the trading agreement signed 
by President Clinton. NAFTA became an easy target for both candidates as 
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the images of Mexican maquiladoras operating just across the border creating 
clothing and other goods in less than ideal working conditions and for a 
fraction of the wage of Americans working mere miles away were plastered 
on TV sets, billboards, and in newspapers.  
While speaking to packed convention centers and town halls across 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, Obama scorned the lack of enforceable 
labor regulations in America’s trading agreements going back to the NAALC 
side agreement on labor in NAFTA. In August of 2007 during a Democratic  
debate, Obama said he would meet with the Canadian and Mexican presidents 
to “try to amend NAFTA,” and said that the agreement “should reflect the 
principle that our trade should not just be good for Wall Street, but should also 
be good for Main Street.”97 Even after this, Obama pushed further in his 
attempt to best fellow candidate Hillary Clinton saying in a February 2008 
debate that he would "make sure that we renegotiate" NAFTA and use "the 
hammer of a potential opt-out" of NAFTA as leverage to ensure enforceable 
labor and environmental protections.  The New York Times’ opinion page 
summed up the NAFTA mudslinging events between the candidates perfectly, 
saying, “criticisms of trade agreements in Ohio are as predictable as praise for 
ethanol in Iowa.”98  
Much of Obama’s attacks on NAALC where made in order to win the 
much-coveted support of the countries strongest labor unions including the 
AFL-CIO, AFSCME, and Teamsters, who he had done poorly with in the 
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primaries with Hillary Clinton due to his less verbose support of renegotiation 
and insertion of strict and enforceable labor concessions. However, winning 
their support was done at the expense of fluidity on labor issues, including 
within trading agreements. During the election cycle, it appeared that, with his 
history of opposing trade agreements lacking labor rights restrictions, and his 
campaign rhetoric, the international trade community was going to be forced 
to react to an increasingly protectionist U.S. president driven to raise the issue 
of labor rights and instill stricter regulations worldwide .  
 However, what is said in the process of winning votes does not always 
translate into actual policy, a reality that seems to be coming true with respect 
to Obama and the degree to which labor rights play a role in trading 
agreements. President Obama and senior Democrats are picking their battles 
when it comes to labor rights in trade, upholding their promises on some and 
recoiling on others. Slippage on the labor issue and renegotiation of NAFTA 
started before he was elected, when it was reported that Obama’s senior 
economic adviser Austin Goolsbee, who now holds the role of chief 
economist and staff director for the economic recovery advisory board, had 
told officials in the Canadian government that Obama's strong rhetoric on 
renegotiating NAFTA in order to include more enforceable labor provisions 
was nothing more than talk, and that he was not planning on actually 
renegotiating (Youngman, 2009). However, after getting banished from the 
Obama campaign, Mr. Goolsbee is being vindicated since he, not Obama, was 
telling the truth as to the intentions of the new president.  
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Ron Kirk, the U.S. Trade Representative for the Obama administration 
said at the Summit of the Americas that it is not necessary to renegotiate 
NAFTA to follow through on Obama's campaign promise of making sure that 
stronger labor provisions with better enforcement mechanisms make it into the 
agreement. He said, "The president has said we will look at all options, but I 
think they can be addressed without having to reopen the agreement"99 Both 
Canadian President Stephen Harper and Mexican President Vicente Calderon, 
supported this idea as they feared lessened trade with their largest trading 
partner. However, Obama and the Democrats will have to balance the foreign 
demands of trading partners and the labor demands from labor unions and 
workers within the United States. Renegotiating NAFTA took a position on 
the back burner though as Ron Kirk pushed the idea of voting on the other 
trade agreements that remained in limbo, like Panama and the labor-focused, 
hotly-debated Columbia Free Trade Agreement. 
 In addition to the talk on NAFTA, the Columbia FTA, which has 
failed to pass since it was negotiated in 2006, has and will continue to be a 
sticking point for the Democratic Party. Above all else, the Columbia FTA is 
the one trade agreement whose passage is solely based upon labor provisions. 
Almost all Democrats, including President Obama, stand defiant against the 
agreement as currently negotiated. While it does contain some labor 
provisions, the provision as written do little to force Columbia to take action 
in dealing with the violence against labor leaders that rampages across the 
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country. Although the Uribe government has taken steps to try to deal with the 
violence and increase their labor rights in order to be viewed in a more 
favorable light in the U.S. Congress, the Columbia FTA seems destined to not 
gain ground.100 President Obama's stance on Columbia, like many other 
Democrats is unyielding, and unlike the other labor concessions he has made 
or seems poised to be able to accept, the labor violence and poor enforcement 
capabilities of Columbia’s current laws makes blocking the FTA until stronger 
labor standards and laws can be added a stronger platform on which to stand. 
 USTR Ron Kirk, who was a very strong proponent of free trade when 
he was the mayor of Dallas, Texas, said that “the administration planned 
expeditious reviews of pending trade agreement with Colombia.”101 He also 
countered the call by many new fair trade Democrats and others in the party 
by saying that Colombia had made “remarkable progress” in reducing 
violence, and that while the attacks against labor activists do still occur, he 
would enter into extensive discussions with Congress on the matter.102 Even 
after Kirk committed himself to working toward its passage, Congressional 
Democrats and labor groups in the United States have said that the Uribe 
government must do more to stop the anti-labor violence and hold perpetrators 
accountable, a position Mr. Obama supported during his campaign.103  Rep. 
Mike Michaud, the leader of a group of 54, mostly Democrats, House 
members responded to bringing the Columbia agreement to the House for a 
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vote saying, "This is absolutely outrageous and a serious mistake."104 If the 
White House submits the agreement to Congress, it will have to garner 
support for the legislation from Republicans to get it approved, especially in 
the House.  
The Obama administration is being confronted with one of the most 
difficult opening periods for a president, and the plethora of other issues on 
Obama’s agenda may be pushing the promise of labor rights onto the back 
burner. Congressional Democrats, as stated before, are torn on the issue of 
labor rights having a role in trading agreements to the extent that labor 
organizations and millions of unemployed former manufacturing workers 
demand. President Obama has realized that he needs the support of the new, 
large Democratic majorities in both houses to pass his agenda, and pushing 
forward a strict and strong policy on labor would alienate members of 
Congress and foreign officials in a time when trade has greatly diminished.  
Due to the current economic conditions and the vastness of President 
Obama’s agenda, it is still debatable whether labor rights or renegotiation of 
NAFTA or the other trade pacts on the table, discussed below, will happen 
this year or until next year after the midterm elections have occurred. 
However, progress on the Columbia trade agreement (which has greater ties to 
labor rights, and the issue of violence against labor unionists is tying up its 
passage) is stalled and even though it is being aggressively advanced by 
USTR Kirk, it will not likely reach floor debate until next year.  
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IV. The current Labor Heavy Trade Fights  
 
After looking at the 2006 and 2008 elections and the election of President 
Obama, it is important to dissect how the Democrats view and what they want 
to occur in pending and upcoming trade agreements as far as labor rights is 
concerned. According to Kimberly Elliot, formerly of the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, the inclusion of labor provisions in trade 
agreements is primarily the result of the need to gain Congressional approval 
for these agreements.105 With the Democrats now in power of both the 
Executive and Legislative branches, it will be a requirement that a country’s 
labor laws will have to be written and enforced as per the ILO’s fundamental 
principles before, or at least during, negotiations of a trading agreement with 
the United States. Many countries where FTAs with the United States have 
been recently passed, negotiated, or coveted, such as Bahrain, Chile, 
Guatemala, and Morocco, have all undertaken extensive reforms in terms of 
their law laws in anticipation of negotiating FTAs or RTAs with the United 
States. For example, Oman had a labor law that strictly restricted or made 
illegal labor organizing, however, they made drastic changes to the law as a 
condition of completing RTA negotiations with the United States.106 
 Currently, the United States has three RTAs pending-Columbia, Panama, 
and South Korea-although labor rights arguments are at the heart of only the 
Columbian RTA. In a recommitment to his promises made in his second State 
of the Union Address in February, President Obama once again took up the 
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trade expansionist banner and expressed a desire to complete the three free 
trade agreements. In his address, Obama said that he would work to double 
American exports over the next five years, and putting these agreements into 
motion could go a long way in making this a reality. He recommitted to this in 
a speech made on July 7, 2010 where he said that he would call on Congress 
to make a strong push in renegotiating the stalled Panama and Columbia 
agreements. This promise came after a similar speech made at the G20 
summit in Toronto in June where President Obama pledged support and 
pressure on the South Korean FTA.  
Speaking from the east room of the White House, at an event which 
was intended to highlight the efforts that the Administration had undertaken to 
promote trade, Obama said, “For a long time, we were trapped in a false 
political debate in this country, where business was on one side and labor was 
on the other….what we now have an opportunity to do is to refocus our 
attention where we’re all in it together.” He also made a pledge that he would 
do everything in his power to “keep the playing field level” for American 
companies that send their products overseas.107 This is important to a 
Democratic president because as we have seen, trade is a particularly difficult 
issue for many Democrats in the modern era due to the fact that there is a 
strong union-influenced view that American workers suffer disproportionately 
when the United States lowers trade barriers.  
This pledge, coming in an election year brings on some more 
challenges for Democratic legislators, especially those up for reelection.  
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Manufacturing has been hit particularly hard by the global recession and it 
may be difficult for legislators to support these agreements and be able to hold 
the “Fair Trade” banner bestowed upon them by organized labor.  The major 
consternation on the South Korea pact revolves around the Democratic 
concerns about South Korea’s restrictions on automobile and beef imports 
from the United States. President Obama has vowed to address these concerns 
before sending the agreement to Congress. 
 President Obama, who is under heavy pressure from business leaders, 
does have some Democratic allies on the issue. After the president’s G-20 
pledges on trade in Toronto, Representative Steny Hoyer, who is the House 
Democratic Majority Leader, called for Obama to renegotiate all three stalled 
pacts and send them to Congress. Those in the House leadership are often the 
biggest trade proponents among the Democratic Party. The rest of the party is 
mixed in their support, and is heavily dependent on their location and whether 
it is amid America’s manufacturing and organized labor heavy areas.  
In order to renegotiate the pact in a labor friendly, but politically 
feasible way, Obama appointed 18 corporate and labor leaders, including chief 
executives from Ford Motor and Walt Disney, to a council to advise him on 
the pacts. The White House has also noted that there has been a 17 percent 
increase in American exports during the first four months of 2010, compared 
with the same period from 2009, showing that the economy may be pulling 
out of the recession and American manufacturing is bouncing back, even if 
that is a reserved rebound. “We’re upping our game for the playing field of 
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the 21st century, … But we’ve got to do it together. We’ve got to all row in 
the same direction.”108 The true test will be how the Democrats renegotiate the 
pacts and how they write labor concerns into any future trading pacts. 
Under a precedent set in the 1990s, any future trading agreements will 
likely have a labor section that is very similar to the labor section in the U.S.-
Jordan FTA. Therefore, in order to understand the future labor rights 
discussions that will occur, it is important that we briefly look at the Jordan 
agreement before moving onto the real conflict as far as labor is concerned, 
Columbia. 
V. Columbia:  
While Colombia has ratified all eight of the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) fundamental conventions, they have failed to ensure the 
safety of union leaders and failed to enforce the laws currently in place.109 
Speaking about Columbia in a March 2008 speech, Obama said he would 
oppose a FTA with Columbia because, "the violence against unions in 
Colombia would make a mockery of the very labor protections that we have 
insisted be included in these kinds of agreements." In a report published by 
the U.S. Department of State in March 2006, they wrote of Colombian trade 
unionists who are forced to endure selective, systematic, and persistent 
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violence perpetrated primarily by illegal armed groups for both political and 
financial reasons. It further stated that the violence and anti-union 
discrimination that is being perpetrated causes workers to balk at joining a 
union and engaging in union activities.110 An Embassy of Colombia report to 
the United States in 2007, stated that there was a two-thirds decline in murders 
of trade unionists since 2002, and that this decrease was largely due to the 
greatly increased amount of resources and initiatives that Columbian President 
Uribe’s administration has put into effect to deal with the problem. 
The Columbian government and President Uribe enacted the National 
Development Plan in order to protect labor union members, their families, and 
other groups at their homes, at work and in public.111  
 However, other sources suggest that violence against trade unionists 
has continued to occur with only relatively small decreases due to the fact that 
perpetrators have been able to act with little fear of punishment. In reports to 
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations from Colombian trade unionists and also as presented 
separately by the International Trade Union Conference, 95 to 99 percent of 
cases concerning anti-union violence are claimed to go unpunished.112 
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                Table1  
                Colombia’s Progress against Violence, 2002-2007  
 
 2002 2007 Change 
Common homicides 28,837 17,180 -40% 
Civilians assasinated 
by illegal armed groups 2,087 358 -83% 
Trade unionists killed 205 25 -88% 
Kidnappings 2,882 515 -82% 
Total terrorist attacks 1,645 381 -77% 
                          Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Social Protection. 
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It is due to the fact that many of these crimes and violence are not 
prosecuted and even more are not reported that the Democrats are blocking the 
Columbia FTA.  In a letter speaking about the progess of the Columbia FTA from 
Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca), Rep. Steny Hoyer, Rep. Charles Rangel, and Rep. 
Sander Levin on June 29, 2007 said, “There is widespread concern in Congress 
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about the level of violence in Colombia, the impunity, the lack of investigations 
and prosecutions, and the role of the paramilitary. Issues of this nature cannot 
solely be resolved through language in a trade agreement. We believe there must 
first be concrete evidence of sustained results on the ground in Colombia, and 
members of Congress will continue working with all interested parties to help 
achieve this end before consideration of any FTA. Consequently, we cannot 
support the Colombia FTA at this time.”114 The majorities of Democrats in both 
Houses remain uneasy about Columbia and still doubt the progress that 
Colombian President Uribe has touted. President Uribe has played host, on a 
number of occasions, to visiting legislators; although, most of the visits have been 
done by Republican supporters of the legislation who are met with glowing 
examples of how far Columbia has come as far as labor rights. However, 
Democrats are quick to point out that President Uribe has spent millions of 
dollars on public relations campaigns, lobbying firms, and the visiting legislators 
rarely, if ever, get to speak to labor unionists115.   
 As for when and if the Columbia FTA movement will be reignited, little 
evidence remains on how much President Obama and legislative Democrats will 
require from the Columbian government in exchange for its passage. USTR Kirk 
has made bringing the Columbia FTA out of legislative purgatory, reviving it, 
and passing the FTA one of his chief priorities for this legislature which will end 
early in 2011. With Obama’s newly granted support and backing, it certainly 
makes a potential passage before the end of this legislature more feasible, but the 
likelihood that Democrats will take a stand on the Columbia agreement with 
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many of them fighting for their political lives remains very unlikely for the 
remainder of the year. So without significant Obama support, above and far 
beyond this pledge, it seems more likely that the Columbia FTA will be an 
element that will be left until after the midterm elections and to the next 
Congress, one which many seem to think may include more conservative voices.   
 
VI. The Future of Labor and Trade, Where Will Go Next 
   
A) What path ought we take between trade and labor? 
 
This paper has already laid out the historical frameworks dictating how we 
arrived at our current position at the apex of labor organizations, trade policy, 
and the transition of the Democratic Party. It seems fitting then to tackle the 
issues and consequences of this direction we appear to be heading and analyze 
the actions that the federal government could and should take which would be 
most advantageous for Americans in the aggregate and our trading partners in 
the long run. Based on the complex interests of both labor organizations and 
free trade advocates, there is no easy way to spell out exactly what should be 
done in all cases. There is no magical formula that will allow for a choice 
what is best for all Americans and for foreigners alike, however, if history is 
any evidence, and as has been shown it undoubtedly is, trade expansion is 
better for the interests of America and Americans than protectionist, trade-
restricting policies.   
Trade benefits Americans, but not equally, creating a situation where 
trade expansion is the best unfeasible option. According to the United States 
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Trade Representative, trade has expanded U.S. annual incomes by more than 
$1 trillion since 1945, meaning that, by disaggregating this figure by 
population estimates, every U.S. household has gained $9,000 in income 
based on this trade expansion.116 Also according to the USTR, while speaking 
at a Senate Finance Committee meeting on February 15, 2007, USTR Susan 
Schwab said that expanding free trade and following a greatly expanded trade 
liberalization agenda would cause the GDP of the United States to increase by 
a further $500 billion. This would assuredly enable American companies to be 
able to compete in foreign markets, creating jobs and propping the vital 
bottom lines of U.S. companies who have slipped during the current global 
economic recession.  
Seeing the paradox that lies ahead, the following presents a 
nonpartisan and nonaligned look at just a sampling of the programs which 
could be expanded or created, which would have the effect of serving the best 
interests of all parties involved. In particular, the elements that most free 
traders see as a way that trade liberalization can continue even in the face of 
union opposition are as follows: a greatly expanded and more effective Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program, an expanded retraining program in more 
skilled professions which are trade resistant, increased access and affordability 
of places of higher education for all citizens, but especially those whose jobs 
have been downsized or outsourced due to increased international trade, and a 
corporate driven commitment to instituting basic labor rights.   
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 An expanded Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program could be the 
element which allows Americans to support an expanded trade platform. It 
seems like an obvious idea that if all Americans can benefit from an expanded 
trade platform, that the winners in the trade game should compensate the 
losers for their sacrifices to the common good. TAA was created as an 
element of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, and while it was 
expanded in the 1970s, it still lacks a certain element of efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
The purpose of TAA was, and is, to act as a buyout of American 
workers in exchange for their tacit acceptance of outsourcing and the isolated 
negative employment aspects of trade liberalization. “When asked if 
government assistance for workers hurt by trade would affect their views on 
whether LDCs should be given greater access to the American market, two-
thirds of respondents said that they would now support free trade, up from 36 
percent before they were informed about the economic effects of 
protectionism and 50 percent when informed about the negative economic 
implications of protectionism.”117 While effective in this element, the idea of a 
buyout of American workers to essentially get them to not complain does not 
solve the problem, it only adds to the growing welfare state in the United 
States. According to the Department of Labor, the current TAA program 
“offers a variety of benefits and services to eligible workers, including job 
training, income support, job search and relocation allowances, a tax credit to 
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help pay the costs of health insurance, and a wage supplement to certain 
reemployed trade-effected workers 50 years of age and older.”118  
While all of these elements are indeed beneficial to displaced workers, 
TAA is not distributed according to the policies which govern its use. 
According to a study by Robert Baldwin in 1980, a system of compensation 
such as TAA does exist in many countries that face the similar problems of 
the isolated negative effects of trade liberalization. Baldwin is quick to point 
out, however, that none of these programs fully compensates those who are 
affected, like in the United States, based on the fact that many of these plans 
require expensive administration to determine who gets compensated and at 
what levels.119In order to qualify for TAA, a certain threshold must be met 
stating that the major reasons that the person was let go or whose job was 
shifted must have been due to outsourcing and/or trade aspects and not other 
elements which often lead to one losing his/her job.  
This is more difficult to prove that one would assume and thus, many 
individuals who should be granted TAA privileges are never given any form 
of compensation, and many who should not be eligible for assistance are 
awarded benefits. It should be further noted that as Baldwin states, “there is 
evidence suggesting that … [these unemployment benefits] may make 
employers more willing to lay off worker and encourage those who do lose 
their jobs to remain unemployed for longer periods than otherwise.”120  It is in 
this last point where the main flaw of the program resides; it does not 
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adequately transition formerly employed workers into newer expanding 
careers, but helps them remain unemployed or to move into similar career 
paths in other areas or in other markets, which are often also jeopardized by 
trade, perpetuating the problems that were inherent to begin with.  
In order to combat these challenges, TAA should be offered as a bonus 
payment on top of unemployment assistance but should be more of a 
retraining and reeducation program than a compensation program which can 
last for more than a year. If TAA was made to be more of a reeducation 
program, workers could be able to easily transition into growing careers, 
bringing them back the dignity of being employed and removing them from 
the burdens of the U.S. government, allowing trade to blossom and the deficit 
to be reduced. However, this can only be accomplished by working on making 
higher education in the United States a much easier to obtain privilege. In the 
United States there have been drastic and egregious price increases that have 
been witnessed at every type of higher education institution, from community 
colleges and state universities right up through the private Ivy League 
institutions. (Graphs outlining the tuition increases in the United States can be 
found in the appendix) In there lies the problems as the careers of the future 
will require increasingly advanced levels of education. As can be seen in the 
below graphs from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2010-2011 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, the jobs which will experience the most 
growth in the next 10 years will all require advanced education, the kind not 
available on-the-job.  
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Net college costs* as a percent of family income 
  1992 
2005 
(MU 2006) 
% pts 
increases 
Top-Bottom 
gaps 
At public four-year colleges and universities 
Lowest 20% income families 57% 73% 16% 
50% pts (1992)  
64% pts (2005) 
Middle 20% 17% 23% 5% 
Highest 20% 7% 9% 1% 
At public two-year colleges 
Lowest 20% income families 50% 58% 8% 
44% pts (1992) 
51% pts (2005) 
Middle 20% 14% 17% 3% 
Highest 20% 6% 7% 1% 
 
industry will never be able to find the same income level or benefits in the 
jobs available today with the same low-education levels as was once possible. 
In order to make U.S. citizens more competitive in the increasingly high-tech 
and educated world, the costs of education must be corralled. While the 
United States may have some of the highest levels of education in the 
developed world, a workforce that has even higher levels of education will be 
better able to bring the United States into a new era of development and 
prosperity while allow it to embrace increased liberalized international trade. 
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It seems clear that the easiest way that America can promote trade 
liberalization and keep Americans employed and prosperous is to train people 
and prepare them in a way which allows them to escape the negative effects of 
international trade, such as what would be possible if educational attainment 
was facilitated and cheaper. 
Lastly, multinational corporations could go a long way toward 
assuaging the trade concerns of liberalization if they committed themselves to 
adopting corporate business policies which institute basic labor rights, 
circumventing the delicate and difficult international political field. Labor 
concerns in international trade have been an issue that has been discussed 
through international governing bodies for much of the past half a century. 
Most prominently, it emerged as part of the current Doha Round of trade 
negotiations, and remains as one of the topics stalling international passage of 
the round. However, many companies have been responding to the demands 
of public opinion by instituting their own labor standards. There are a number 
of basic practices which could be adopted with little real economic effect, but 
drastic social implications both in Western markets and in the areas of 
production. 
Too many and too strong labor standards can be detrimental to the 
workers, employers and growth of developing countries, instituting basic 
standards could be beneficial for all three concerns. According to Kimberly 
Elliot, the most common complaints in LDC workplaces are: dark, crowded, 
hot and noisy workplaces; no emergency exists or fire extinguishers; 
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inadequate or no restroom time; no place to eat; abusive supervisors; below 
minimum wage payments; an absence of written contracts; compulsory 
overtime; sexual or other harassment of workers; late-or short-wage payments. 
Elliot follows by asking, “How expensive would it be to remedy some of these 
problems? Providing emergency exit lights in a workplace or fire 
extinguishers or giving workers security from sexual or other harassment or 
the right to go to the toilet should be relatively inexpensive.”122  In terms of 
aggregate costs, it would be hard to imagine that correcting these concerns 
would represent a dire attack on the bottom lines of these companies. Spread 
over the large production output that many of these companies exhibit, the 
minor costs that are represented in these fixes would likely amount to little 
more than a small budgetary line. In addition, many of these companies could 
make up for these fixes through increased worker productivity and positive 
public opinion which could serve to boost international appeal and sales. 
Firms such as Nike and other manufactures have responded to public opinion 
by enforcing minimal labor standards and have used the once negative 
reaction to working conditions to their benefit, bearing witness to strong 
growth in international sales. 
 Whether in terms of correcting simple labor concerns, creating a more-
educated society that is better able to adapt to a changing global environment 
or building and managing an enhanced and more efficient TAA program, the 
United States must commit itself to creating a situation where liberalization is 
welcomed and not met with angry anti-globalists raining rocks and other 
                                                 
122
 Elliot, 2003, p.19 
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projectiles on G20 security forces. Liberalized trade is beneficial to the 
interests of the American public and to the country in general and thusly 
should be assisted and promoted in whatever ways are possible.  
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Appendix 1 
1993 Fast Track Authorization 
Final House Vote on H.R. 1876                                      
June 22, 1993 2:19 PM                                        
Bill Title:  
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican 150 23  3 
Democrat 145 102  10 
Independent  1  0 
Totals 295 126 0 13 
 
 
Final Senate Vote on HR 1876 
Vote Date:  June 30, 1993, 06:36 PM  
Bill Title: 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  37 4  3 
Democrat 39 12  5 
Independent      
Totals 76 16 0 8 
 
 
NAFTA 
 
Final House Vote on H R 3450  
November 17, 1993 10:36 PM 
Bill Title: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  132 43  0 
Democrat 102 156  0 
Independent   1  0 
Totals 234 200 0 0 
 
Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R.3450  
Vote Date:  November 20, 1993, 07:28 PM 
Bill Title: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
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 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  34 10   
Democrat 27 28  1 
Independent      
Totals 61 38 0 1 
 
WTO Membership for the United States 
 
Final House Vote on Passage of HR 5110  
November, 29 1994       6:39 PM 
Bill Title: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  121 56   
Democrat 167 89   
Independent   1   
Totals 288 146 0 0 
 
Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 5110 
December 1, 1994         6:48 PM 
Measure Title:  A bill to approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  35 10   
Democrat 41 14   
Independent      
Totals 76 24 0 0 
 
 
African Growth and Opportunities Act 
 
Final House Vote on Passage on H R 434  
July 16, 1999                2:19 PM 
Title: African Growth and Opportunity Act 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  136 63  24 
Democrat 98 99  13 
Independent   1   
Totals 234 163 0 37 
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Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 434 
November 3, 1999           05:56 PM 
Measure Title:  An act to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Sahara 
Africa, expand trade benefits to the countries in the Caribbean Basin, renew the 
generalized system of preferences, and reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance 
programs. 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  46 6  2 
Democrat 30 13  2 
Independent      
Totals 76 19 0 4 
 
 
China Normal Trade Relations 
 
Final House Vote on Passage of H R 4444   
May 24, 2000                5:41 PM 
Bill Title: To Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade 
Relations Treatment) to the People’s Republic of China 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  164 57  1 
Democrat 73 138   
Independent   2   
Totals 237 197 0 1 
 
Final Senate Vote on Passage of HR 4444  
September 19, 2000       02:21 PM  
Bill Title:  To authorize extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations 
treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  45 8   
Democrat 38 7  2 
Independent      
Totals 83 15 0 2 
 
 
2001 – 2002 Fast Track Authorization 
 
Final House Vote on Passage of H R 3005 
December 6, 2001          4:37 PM 
Bill Title: Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act 
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 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  194 23  4 
Democrat 21 189  1 
Independent   2   
Totals 215 214 0 5 
 
Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 3005 
May 23, 2002                8:13 PM  
Bill Title:  A bill to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade 
benefits under that Act, and for other purposes.  
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  42 5  3 
Democrat 24 25  1 
Independent      
Totals 66 30 0 4 
 
 
Andean Trade Preference Act 
 
Final House Vote on H R 3009 
July 27, 2002                3:30 AM 
QUESTION:  On Agreeing to the Conference Report 
BILL TITLE: Andean Trade Preference Act 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  190 27  5 
Democrat 25 183  2 
Independent   2   
Totals 215 212 0 7 
 
Final Senate Vote on H.R. 3009 
August 1, 2002              04:18 PM  
Bill Title:  A bill to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade 
benefits under that Act, and for other purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  44 5  1 
Democrat 20 29  1 
Independent      
Totals 64 34 0 2 
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Chile FTA 
 
Final House Vote on Passage of H.R.2738 
July 24, 2003                 3:47 PM 
Bill Title: United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  195 27  6 
Democrat 75 128  2 
Independent   1   
Totals 270 156 0 8 
 
Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 2738 
July 31, 2003                     09:22 PM  
Bill Title:  A bill to implement the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
 
 Yeas Nays Present 
Not 
Voting 
Republican  43 7  1 
Democrat 22 24  2 
Independent   1   
Totals 65 32 0 3 
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Appendix 2 
 
Net Tuition figures are complimentary of the Center for College 
Affordability. Their findings are included below. 
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Summary 
There has been much talk over the past 50 years about the role of American labor 
in a changing American industrial market. As the world has become increasingly 
connected, American workers who tout high levels of labor rights, high wages, and safe 
working conditions have been hard pressed to compete with emerging economies that 
often share little of these same principles or legal decrees. Worker’s rights have become 
an increasingly important topic for American labor.  The debate over American 
competitiveness in the world has been fought on the picket lines, on the streets, in back 
rooms and most importantly in the stolid white columned halls of Congress. While 
liberalized trade was widely supported within both Democratic and Republican 
Congressional platforms in the post-war period, this stance has suffered from a slow 
change, especially as the century came to a close. 
Both sides of the debate are grounded and steadfast in their support or opposition 
to a liberalized trade framework. Organized labor has progressed over the century from 
supporting a liberalized trade platform when American manufacturing and blue-collar 
jobs had a comparative advantage in an industrializing world, to demanding favorable 
trade regulations when input and labor prices in the rest of the world began to undercut 
American industries. Organized labor has also been quick to point out that the lack of a 
global labor rights framework which has enforcement capabilities will precipitate into a 
global race to the bottom where workers in the developed world will suffer wage cuts in 
order to allow American industries to remain competitive. Unions point to the growing 
productivity/wage gap as a sign that this problem is already diminishing the pay of the 
American blue collar worker. They point to evidence from the Department of Labor and 
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from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics that shows that there has been a large fall in relative 
wages while the productivity of American workers has continuously increased, and ranks 
nearly at the top of the most productive workers in the world. Unions also like to point 
out that in nearly all major surveys conducted, consumers are willing to pay slightly more 
for goods which were produced by American based manufacturers in order to guarantee 
that they were created under fair and safe working conditions. Business groups take the 
opposite stand (Some exceptions exist). Businesses support a liberalized trade platform so 
that they have the freedom to put all potential cost saving and other business practices 
into effect. American manufacturing sees accessing pools of cheap labor as a necessity to 
compete in a globalized world where the mobility of capital is augmented by the mobility 
of labor across many regions of the globe.  They also point to the detrimental effects of 
labor unions in the market; they show studies that unions have caused large negative 
GDP effects since the 1950s. Businesses also make an argument against imposing labor 
provisions on foreign countries, potentially not in the wishes of their workers or 
governments.   
The trade/labor debate has undergone a complete revolution over the last 40 
years. In the post war years and even through the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations in 
the 1960s, Democrats and their constituencies were fervently in favor of liberalized trade, 
voting nearly unanimously in some cases to extend free trade privileges or reduce barriers 
to trade. However, as the trade deficit emerged in the 1970s and American manufacturing 
began a decline that would only quicken in pace, Democrats were forced by the industries 
and labor unions that comprised a large part of their constituencies to support 
protectionist measures. Democratic legislators helped to pass import restrictions and 
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content requirements which protected auto and textile companies against competition 
from foreign producers. They even went so far as to pass trade restrictions against Japan 
in an attempt to limit their suffering. 
The trade debate took on the prominent role that it plays today with the NAFTA 
debate in the early 1990s. The Business Roundtable, sponsored by the United States 
Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers went head to 
head with labor unions such as the AFL-CIO. President Clinton inherited the NAFTA 
trade deal from former President George H.W. Bush, and was forced to work with the 
Republicans in Congress to pass the deal as the majority of the Democrats remained 
opposed. When he first came into office, President Clinton’s position on trade was 
unknown and his early speeches and appointments did little to clear anything up. Clinton, 
currying favor to the Democratic labor constituencies, argued for and won a side 
agreement on labor that became a part of the agreement, although the lack of teeth in the 
document left labor unions feeling betrayed and searching for answers.  
The anger of the NAFTA debates would translate into the next decade, although 
the Republican Revolution in 1996, which lasted until 2006, shut the Democrats out of 
the trade debate. With the Democrats looking in from the outside, their loquacious allies, 
organized labor, continued to pressure them to impose restrictions on trade to support 
American manufacturing and blue-collar workers. During the Bush years, the United 
States went through one of the most active periods of trade liberalization, although the 
Jordan model did provide for an acknowledgement of the importance of labor rights. 
However, it severely lacked the teeth or the requirements needed to be effective.  
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Organized labor and the Democratic Party stormed back in 2006 and in 2008 as 
the “Fair Trade” movement swept dozens of Fair Trade minded legislators, who have put 
trade and specifically labor rights and standards back on the table, into office. However it 
has become apparent that there is a discrepancy in the opinions of the old block 
democratic leadership and the new arrivals. The Democratic leadership, including the 
leaders of the trade committees, notably Sander Levin (D-MI) and other leaders such as 
Nancy Pelosi have come out in support of liberal trade as long as labor has a place at the 
table and sufficient labor concerns are taken into account. However, the newly elected 
members of Congress widely supported a moratorium on trade liberalization and a 
renegotiation of all previous trade agreements. The inauguration of a new Democratic 
president, Barack Obama, was supposed to be a champion of labor standards and bring 
forth a new era of trade negotiations. However with the state of the economy in full 
freefall, trade was put on the back burner and with the Canadian NAFTA comment by an 
Obama campaign insider to a Canadian official, it is unclear whether Obama will truly 
push through the currently outstanding trade agreement which have been negotiated. 
Significance 
 There remain surprisingly few comprehensive studies looking into the roles that 
labor unions have played in shaping the trade policies of the United States. Looking at the 
past elections provides enough evidence to show that the support of labor unions is not 
only a welcomed element of Democratic campaigns, but a requirement. Trade policy for 
many of these unions and companies in trade competitive sectors consists are highly 
protectionist and this has clearly rubbed off on legislators. It is my hope that this research 
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will go a long way into beginning to open up this debate and bring this significance to the 
forefront of American politics. 
 Many Americans have not contemplated the policy implications of a single party 
controlled government, whether that be protectionist Democrats or trade liberalist 
Republicans  In a completely Democratically controlled Congress and with a Democratic 
president this could lead trade policy down a slippery slope toward protectionism at a 
time when we should be embracing reducing trade barriers for American products. With 
this report, it is my hope that Americans can support a balanced trade framework that 
embraces a liberalized trade framework that also protects American and foreign workers.  
